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ABSTRACT
Exploring the Roots of Chronic Underdevelopment:
The Colonial Encomienda and Resguardo and their Legacy to Modern Colombia
by
Pedro Bossio
Advisor: David Gordon
Colombian society has been historically marked by socioeconomic inequality, restricted
social mobility, and institutional weakness. In order to understand the reasons for the country´s
continuous struggle to achieve inclusive economic progress and stability since its independence
from Spain in 1819, it is necessary to understand its colonial history. Central to this were the
two most important colonial economic institutions, the encomienda and the resguardo, both
designed for the exploitation of unfree Indian labor. Even when these were slowly replaced by
more modern haciendas worked by free farm workers, the economic and political life of the
country continued to be determined by older forms of subordination and exploitation
established in the earliest days of Spanish colonial rule. This thesis focuses on the eastern
highlands of northern South America, principally the area around Bogota, and analyzes how the
encomienda, resguardo, and hacienda were fundamental in determining how wealth was
acquired in the region, and the extent of the economic opportunities available to various
sectors of society. Colombia’s institutionalized hierarchy based on racial and social distinctions
had given economic and political advantages to a small group of Spaniards and their
descendants living in the country’s most important urban centers. This is as much true today as
iv

in colonial times. The vast majority of the population, especially in rural areas, has remained
politically and economically marginalized. An examination of these historical developments will
provide a more comprehensive understanding of the seemingly intractable nature of
Colombia’s economic limitations and social turmoil today.
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1. Introduction
Colombian society has been historically marked by limited economic opportunities,
restricted social mobility, and institutional corruption. In order to understand the reasons for
Colombia’s continuous struggle to achieve inclusive economic progress and stability since its
independence from Spain in 1819, it is not enough to record which groups have benefited the
most, which have been excluded, and which institutions govern society today. It is also necessary
to understand how a privileged class was originally formed, how it has historically protected and
advanced its position, and more importantly, how other sectors of society have been excluded
from legal protection and socioeconomic opportunities. In order to do this, it is necessary to look
to colonial times to identify the roots of these dynamics, which lie in the encomienda and
resguardo institutions, as well as in the emergence of the hacienda economic model. These were
instrumental in determining the institutional, social, and economic structure of the New Kingdom
of New Granada, the area corresponding to modern Colombia.
The first century after the Spanish conquest of the New World was crucial in determining
the path each Latin American colony took in the evolution of its social and economic institutions.
This thesis focuses on the central highlands of northern South America, principally the area
around Bogota. It analyzes how key institutions helped determine how wealth was accumulated
in the region, and the extent to which various sectors of society were allowed access to it.
Central to this was the creation of an institutionalized social hierarchy based on racial and social
distinctions that gave privileged status to a small group of Spaniards living in politically
important urban centers, and the marginalization of the vast majority of the population,
especially in rural areas. An examination of these developments will provide a more
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comprehensive understanding of the seemingly intractable nature of Colombia’s economic
limitations and social turmoil today.

Columbus´ voyage of 1492 marked the beginning of more than three centuries of Spanish
domination in the Americas. This period saw immense transfers of wealth from the New World
to Europe and Asia. It also witnessed the dramatic decimation of Native Americans through
diseases and over work, as well as the assimilation of the rest into Spanish Christian culture.
Upon arrival in the New World, the Spanish encountered unprecedented circumstances – an
entire continent ripe for conquest, and the potential for the creation of an empire larger than any
since that of Genghis Khan, all filled with a bewildering array of societies and cultures
previously unsuspected by anyone outside of the Americas. Yet within a remarkably short period
of time a small number of Spaniards created a colonial enterprise that secured for themselves a
position at the top of a new and complex social hierarchy. They were also able to adapt
precociously in the centuries that followed to new circumstances that allowed them to maintain
that position. But it was in this first period that the creation of social, economic, political and
military institutions that would leave an indelible mark on the continent was accomplished.
These not only influenced the character of the Latin American republics formed in the early
nineteenth century, but continue to do so today.
To achieve their imperial goals, the Spanish focused their empire building on Mexico and
the highlands of Central and South America, where the most hierarchically complex and densely
populated pre-Columbian societies were located. It was from here that most of the labor used in
mines and on estates would come. The most important Spanish colonial cities were also founded
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in the midst of these populations. 1 The consolidation of the conquest was then centered on the
control of indigenous labor through the establishment of religious and political urban centers that
dominated the hinterland. Central to this was the creation of the encomienda, a tributary system
for the distribution of indigenous labor among the conquerors, and Indian “reserve” towns, or
“resguardos”, established at the Crown´s initiative. These fixed natives in areas barred to
Spaniards, blacks, and peoples of mixed origins. Varying across the continent according to local
geography, population size and economic resources, both institutions were nonetheless uniformly
controlled from urban centers dominated by colonial elites, and only later by government
officials.
While it is undeniable that the vast wealth and populations of the New World presented the
Spaniards with a unique opportunity for quick riches and the chance to build new societies out of
the old, they did not create without any reference to the past. Although the colonial institutions of
Spanish America might have seemed unique, they were in fact heavily influenced by
organizations and practices developed earlier in Spain. Centuries of war against the Moors,
constant challenges to the Castilian Crown from a fractious nobility, combined with continuous
interactions with, and occasional persecutions of, two other major religions, left Castile uniquely
prepared to deal with a great variety of cultures and the necessarily complicated interaction with
them. 2 Therefore, before exploring the key features of the colonial economy and urbanization, it
is necessary to understand the historic evolution of that took place in fourteenth and fifteenth
century Castile. This determined the manner in which the New World Empire was built, and the
way in which Castilians in particular acted in it.
1

A brief geographic overview will show that many of the most important Latin America cities are located at high
altitudes. These include Mexico City, Guadalajara, Tegucigalpa, Guatemala City, Bogota, La Paz, and Cuzco, to
name only a few.
2
There was no Spain at the time of Columbus´ voyages. The Crown of Castile was the dominant power in Iberia,
and the main Christian protagonist in the Reconquista.
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2. Background – Late Medieval Castile
The experience of the Reconquista, which was the centuries-long conflict to retake Iberia
from the Muslims, was almost unique in Western Europe. The Spanish kingdom had been
troubled at the same time by almost continuous fighting amongst its noble and urban elites, and
between different noble and royal factions vying for the Crown. It was only during the late
fifteenth century reign of Isabela and Ferdinand that this long struggle between the three most
powerful groups: the Crown, the aristocracy, and an urban patriciate, began to be brought to an
end. That same ruthless royal determination would also lead to the final defeat of the Moors in
1492. The conquest of the New World, which followed only twenty-five years later, was an
extension of this belligerent and crusading spirit. Isabela and Ferdinand, by containing the power
of the aristocracy and subduing their rebellious cities, had prepared the way for the rule of their
grandson, Charles V, and his Hapsburg descendants over the greatest European controlled
empire the world had seen up to that time.
The long process of consolidation of royal power had begun after the conquest of AlAndalus in the thirteenth century. 3 With it came the office of adelantado given to those military
leaders who had organized the victory, and the system of repartimientos (distributions) through
which they were rewarded. Then, starting in the fourteenth century, the office of corregidor was
created. These royal agents were used by the Crown to impose its will on the towns. All of these
arrangements would later be used in the building of the empire in the Americas.

3

Teofilo Ruiz, Spain´s Centuries of Crisis: 1300-1474 (Blackwell Publishing: Malden, MA, 2007), p. 116
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Adelantados and Repartimientos
The final conquest of Al-Andalus was a momentous occasion. The Christian kingdoms of
Iberia had been slowly regaining lost lands at the expense of Muslims since the twelfth century,
when the kingdoms of Portugal, Castile, Leon, and Aragon had finally established themselves as
important powers in the peninsula. After Andalusia, only Muslim Granada remained. All this had
turned the Reconquista irreversibly in favor of Castile (now unified with Leon) which bordered
the deep south.
The adelantado (literally: advance man) had been one of the most important officers of the
Reconquista. Had the Castilian Crown attempted to fight against the Moors across its entire
frontier, it would have stretched itself dangerously thin. Monarchs were painfully aware of the
risks they faced from their own cities and nobles in moments of weakness. The lands of the
frontier had at the same time become depopulated because of Muslim flight to the south. If the
Spanish monarchs wanted to conquer and repopulate these territories, thereby making both towns
and farms productive again, military campaigns and population movement needed to be carefully
coordinated.
The monarchy needed powerful men to do this. It had therefore become almost entirely
dependent on its military commanders. The adelantados had leadership skills, material resources,
and the financial connections to fund campaign, as well as the ability to respond to dangerous
Muslim counteroffensives. Few men were able to pool the resources to fund fighting along even
limited areas of the frontier. Adelantados therefore needed to be either persons of considerable
wealth, or else trusted by investors. The Crown selected them from among major aristocratic
families, and even from within the royal family itself. Each was granted a charter to conquer a
specific area, and was empowered to be its chief judicial and executive official. These men
5

advanced the enterprise against the Moors in the name of the monarchy and God. They
commanded private armies, recruited their own soldiers, and found the means of paying them. 4
(This was no easy task. So great was the shortage of manpower that the Crown even occasionally
granted pardons to criminals who were willing to participate in the campaigns. 5)
The dependence of the Spanish kings on their brave, skilled, and ruthless commanders is
both striking, and typical of feudal relationships between royalty and nobility common in
Europe. However, these paladins proved to be a liability as well as an asset. Monarchs could not
do without them if they wanted to expand their realms. But their very audacity and courage made
them fiercely independent. These same qualities would later allow similar types to conquer and
rule vast territories and peoples in the New World. But, once again, the Crown would soon find it
almost impossible to control them. Even after as strong a monarch as Charles V began to get firm
control in Iberia, royal power in the New World continued to remain something elusive, fleeting,
almost ephemeral.
The Crown therefore had to compromise with adelantados by conceding a substantial
portion of government and territories in Andalusia to them. Monarchs knew in these cases they
had no option if they wanted to keep the land under even nominal Castilian dominion. They
found it would be better to temporarily yield autonomy than to try to overstretch royal
bureaucracy and resources. But the pressing question remained – how temporary would it in fact
be? In this way, conquered cities and lands acquired new governors, who, although they acted in
4

The office has even older precedents, being mentioned as early as the eleventh century, and was not too different
from the Roman Imperial Urban Prefect.
5
Miguel Ladero Quesada and Manuel Gonzalez Jimenez, “La Poblacion en la Frontera de Gibraltar y el
Repartimiento de Vejer, Siglos XIII y XIV” (Population on Gibraltar´s Frontier and Repartimiento of Vejer, XIII
and XIV Centuries). In Historia, Instituciones, Documentos, No. 4 (Universidad de Sevilla, Spain, 1977): 213-214.
Web. 25 October, 2017; Manuel Gonzalez Jimenez, “Poblamiento y Frontera en Andalucia, Siglos XIII-XV”
(Population and Frontier in Andalucia, XIII-XV Centuries). In Revista de la Facultad de Geografia e Historia, No. 4
(Universidad de Sevilla, Spain, 1989): 208. Web. 25 October, 2017
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the name of the Crown, did not want interference in their business. Castile had expanded its
dominions and added cities, and while it is true that some new men who were not part of the
higher social strata received benefits through the repartimientos, the provision of new sources of
wealth and power to great lords created a significant threat to the power of the monarchy. 6
The new rulers also began an extended period of encastillamiento (castle building). This was
justified by the need to control local populations, as well as providing better defense against
foreign invasion. However, it also greatly facilitated regional resistance to central authority. 7 (It
was for this reason that later, in France, Cardinal Richelieu, as a loyal servant of Louis XIII,
demanded the destruction of castles not along the frontier in order to more easily exert royal
power over the nobility). Adelantados families were therefore able to further increase their power
throughout southern Iberia. 8 These transplanted Castilian oligarchs understood that they owed
their importance “not to trade, but to military service, real or presumed, for their royal
appointment”. 9
Long threatened by foreign aggression, Castilian elites had not been able to look beyond
their immediate environment if they wanted to survive. Unlike in England, the Netherlands, or
even Aragon, where elites could also engage in trade and international commerce, they could
never afford to become interested in these things – which soon came to be seen as the province
of foreigners, and beneath members of the nobility. Even among the traditional nobilities of

6

Ruiz, p. 119.
Gonzalez Jimenez, Poblamiento y Frontera en Andalucia, Siglos XIII-XV, p.221. Remnants of this
encastillamiento are still seen throughout the countryside of central Spain, in towns such as Avila, Toledo, and
Valladolid, among others
8
Manuel Gonzalez Jimenez, “Repartimientos Andaluces del Siglo XIII: Perspectiva de Conjunto y Problemas” (XIII
Century Andalucía Repartimientos: Group and Individual Perspective). In Historia, Instituciones, Documentos, No.
14 (Universidad de Sevilla, Spain, 1987): 118-120. Web, 25 October 2017. By the end of the thirteenth century there
were already signs of a new emerging nobility in the Andalusia region
9
Marvin Lunenfeld, Keepers of the City: The Corregidores of Isabella I of Castile (1474-1504) (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987), p. 12
7
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Europe, continuous fighting made Castilians notable in their relentlessly uncompromising
military-based identity. Theirs was in effect a “society organized for perpetual war”. 10 Proud,
stubborn, religious, and intolerant, they developed a character best known at the beginning of the
so-called Dark Ages, when the defenders of the crumbling Roman Empire were faced with
invasions of barbarian hordes.
Even after the tide of Muslim conquest had been stopped, and then turned, that fighting
spirit remained. What had originally been an instinct for self-preservation turned into a restless
and unquenchable desire for conquest. The idea that the only way to attain power and prestige
was through military prowess and Catholic religious exclusiveness remained paramount. Wealth
and land were to be acquired in battles against unbelievers. The medieval idea of decentralized
noble power, still present in much of Europe, had been made particularly intense (and long lived)
in Spain because of particular Iberian conditions. But the conquistador spirit was to have more
terrible consequences. When Castilians entered the vast reaches of the New World the last
vestiges of chivalrous restraint fell away. They then distinguished themselves by their ruthless
aggressiveness and almost boundless rapacity.
Monarchs had understood the danger of this pugnacious spirit long before the final
conquests of the south. Alfonso X had been the first to attempt to codify (and so reduce) the
duties sand privileges of the adelantado mayor in his law code, the Siete Partidas (1265), which
emphasized the judicial aspects of the office. 11 At the same time, monarchs found other, more
imaginative ways of asserting their prerogatives. They began to assign adelantados not only to
newly conquered territories, but also to the already settled northern provinces of Galicia, Castile,
10

Gonzalez Jimenez, Poblamiento y Frontera en Andalucia, Siglos XIII-XV, p. 208
For a general overview of the duties of the adelantado described in the Siete Partidas, see Jose M. Ortuño
Sánchez-Pedreño, “El Adelantado en las Siete Partidas”. In Miscelánea Medieval Murciana, Vol. XVIII (Universidad
de Murcia, Spain, 1994).
11
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Murcia and Leon, hoping in this way not only to use these agents to strengthen the power of the
central government, but also to tame them by turning them into proto-bureaucrats. It did not
work as the Crown had intended. Unfortunately for the monarchy, these high office holders,
either on the frontier (where they only slowly began to lose their military character) or in
established provinces, only came to swell the already large number of aristocrats whose ambition
and economic resources permitted them to challenge royal power.
Conquering an area was just the first step in administering the new regions. The
repopulating and consolidation of the southern lands followed. The difficulty of this was
highlighted by the system of repartimientos. The distribution of plunder and land amongst the
conquerors was simple and straight forward. Rewards were divided according to social status,
caballeros (knights) taking primacy over the rest. However, the Castilian lords had to move into
new and sparsely populated territories. Incentives were needed to induce Castilians to move
there. In some cases, pockets of Muslims were even left unmolested simply because there
weren’t enough Christians available to replace them, and neither Crown nor nobility could profit
from abandoned spaces. In other cases, lands and houses were offered to members of the military
orders of Calatrava and Compostela, both of which had contributed to the crusading effort. 12 So
great was the need that lordship (mayorazgos) over entire regions was offered to men who were
willing and able to defend and repopulate them. 13 The need for migrants became especially
pressing when Castilian forces rapidly overran very large areas. But the ability to keep newly
arrived populations in place was not easy. Those rewarded in the first repartimientos, rather than
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For the repopulation of the area around Gibraltar see Ladero Quesada and Gonzalez Jimenez, La Poblacion en la
Frontera de Gibraltar y el Repartimiento de Vejer; for the area around Carmona, a town east of Seville, see Manuel
Gonzalez Jimenez, “Repartimiento de Carmona, Estudio y Edición” (Carmona Repartimiento, Analysis). In
Historia, Instituciones, Documentos, No. 8 (Universidad de Sevilla, Spain, 1981). Web. 25 October, 2017
13
Ladero Quesada and Gonzalez Jimenez, pp. 213-214; Gonzalez Jimenez, Poblamiento y Frontera en Andalucia,
Siglos XIII-XV, p. 208
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recruiting farmers and townspeople, frequently sold out and then headed outward to participate
in new campaigns, where they hoped to gain even greater rewards. 14

Corregidores
Monarchs found towns equally difficult to control. Those in Castile had long ago been given
royal charters granting them autonomy. These fueros, permitted their male citizens (vecinos) to
elect their own municipal councils. 15 They could also send delegates to the Cortes, Castile´s
representative assembly (the first in the Western world), where fiscal and administrative matters
were discussed. 16 Towns thus enjoyed an advantageous position. As long as the kings were
fighting the Moors, they were not in a position to interfere in urban affairs, since they needed the
help of municipalities as well as the nobility. Monarchs were frequently obliged to grant even
more independence to ensure loyalty during desperate times. This situation changed dramatically
only after the conquest of Al-Andalus. The Crown could then turn to the centralization of power.
(This policy was made even more urgent by the interference of the greatest nobles in city
government. Some councils were almost entirely controlled by them. 17)
The Crown began by appointing judicial magistrates, alcaldes mayores, to aid in the
administration and help maintain royal authority. These were later joined by more powerful
figures, the corrigadores. 18 They were assigned to govern alongside local regidores –hence “co-

14

Gonzalez Jimenez, Repartimiento de Carmona, Estudio y Edición, p. 67. For a more general treatment of
exemptions granted to re-populate and defend Andalusia, see Gonzalez Jimenez, Poblamiento y Frontera en
Andalucia, Siglos XIII-XV.
15
Lunenfeld, pp. 1-23; Ruiz, pp. 110-138.
16
The Cortes predated by more than a century similar assemblies in England and France.
17
Ruiz, p. 110.
18
The first mention of a corregidor, the official charged with bringing towns under control, was in 1348, during the
reign of Alfonso XI
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regidor”, and were charged with curtailing concessions previously granted in fueros. From then
until the advent of Ferdinand and Isabela, Castilian kings used them to protect royal interests,
bring chaotic municipalities into order, and reduce the power of an always present urban
aristocracy. The corregidores did not replace existing institutions; rather, they operated uneasily
alongside them. In periods of royal weakness, municipal councils and aristocrats were able to
bully them and reduce their effectiveness. But with a strong monarch corregidores could
successfully enforce royal authority.
Despite their fluctuating power, corregidores were able to become rich and powerful
through their offices (except of course when resistance from city councils and aristocrats became
insurmountable). Monarchs then had to deal with complaints against those who used their
position for graft. Sometimes these and other abuses triggered riots. This occasionally provided
additional opportunities for aristocrats to enter local government. 19 This in turn prompted the
Crown to create yet another institution, the residencia, with investigative authority to keep
corregidores in check.
Castile in the late fifteenth century was therefore an archipelago of cities and towns each
with its own municipal authorities and regional aristocracies. Each municipality was its own little
kingdom, where the “rich, the powerful and the privileged went their way, occasionally hindered
but rarely humbled”. 20 Much of Spain’s internecine conflicts began to be definitively suppressed
only by the unprecedented assertion of royal authority under Isabella and Ferdinand. 21 Although

19

Lunenfeld, pp. 16-18.
Ruiz, p. 193.
21
After the long reigns of Alfonso VIII of Castile (reign 1158-1214), Alfonso IX of Leon (reign 1188-1230),
Ferdinand III of Castile (reign 1217-1252), and Alfonso X (reign 1252-1284), Castile did not see many competent
and long-lived rulers. Instead, internecine struggles allowed cities and nobility to once again openly defy central
authority, particularly during the minorities of several kings, and especially during the struggle that brought the
Trastamara kings to power in the second half of the fourteenth century. The Trastamara dynasty had come to power
after the illegitimate son of Alfonso XI, Henry II, killed his half-brother and legitimate king, Pedro the Cruel, in
20
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the Catholic monarchs did not introduce many bureaucratic changes, they did bring an
unwavering commitment to make their presence felt throughout their kingdoms, and to ensure
challenges to royal authority were crushed. From the time of the War of the Castilian Succession
(1975-79), which secured the Crown for Isabella and Ferdinand, they successfully used
corregidores to strengthen their rule. They also reduced the number of municipal councils while
making sure they and the Cortes were unable to unite against them. 22 Isabela La Catolica was in
addition innovative in the use of the Inquisition and militant religious orders to destroy those
who opposed her. Finally, Ferdinand and Isabela were able to become more economically
independent through increased taxation on wool exports, and by tribute paid by Muslims and
Jews. 23 Their military campaigns against Granada, which brought all of Iberia under Catholic
rule, further enhanced their prestige (and wealth).
Corregidores as a consequence became permanently powerful instruments of the Crown. At
the same time, they were brought under greater royal control. The monarchs understood
corregidores could not be left to their own devices. This was due not only to the danger of
corruption that could lead to the undermining of royal prestige, but also because without the
visible power of the Crown these officials could not enforce royal interests. 24 In order to project
royal power throughout the country, the Catholic Monarchs, far more than their predecessors,
roamed the land, forging alliances, doing justice, and making sure all classes felt their

1366. Most of the Trastamara kings chose to delegate powers to their constables and dukes, most of whom were
hated throughout Castile. The House of Trastamara suffered from incompetent rulers, a pugnacious nobility, threats
from Muslim forces. Even after a relatively stable period of peace was established with the Muslims, the continuing
struggle for power between the Crown, urban elites and the high nobility went on for more than a century. It was
only at the end of this turmoil that Isabela and Ferdinand came to power in 1474.
22
Lunenfeld, pp. 24-52
23
Ruiz, pp. 127-131, provides a quick analysis of Royal sources of income.
24
So unsure were the monarchs of their authority even in this period, that Spain did not have a fixed capital.
Toledo, Avila, Burgos, Segovia, Valladolid, and even Seville all served as loci of the Castilian court at different
times. It was not until Phillip II moved the court from Valladolid to Madrid in 1561 that the country had a
permanent center
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presence. 25 There was also of course the need to affirm the monarchy’s commitment to justice
and good government. All of this was used by Isabela to present herself and her officials as
defenders of the people (while of course taxing them).
It was during this period too that the first step towards expansion outside Iberia was taken.
The first object of conquest was the Canary Islands. The invasion had begun at the beginning of
the fifteenth century when some nobles wanted the Islands’ dyes for their own textile
manufacturing. For decades thereafter, Crown-backed nobles established military and economic
outposts in the Canaries, following the pattern of the Reconquista. The Crown contracted with
nobles who were active warriors, as well as with others who were primarily investors in military
expeditions. Those who led the campaigns acted as adelantados, and were rewarded with the
usual land and judicial office, as well as grants to establish sugar factories. They were also
allowed to oversee the distribution of rewards to investors in Castile. In addition, they supervised
both the collections of taxes owed to the Crown and the transfer of Castilians to the islands. Over
time these newcomers began to encroach on the lands of the indigenous Guanche inhabitants.
The conquest was at first limited to the smaller islands. Later, the Crown became directly
involved in a full-scale invasion of the larger islands of Grand Canaria and Tenerife. Its
commanders were made gobernadores (governors), similar to the old adelantado (the term was
Isabela’s invention. 26) In addition to the duties performed by the previous adelantados, the
Crown hoped they would become true (and honest) representatives of the monarchy. 27 Instead,
like other royal officials granted extensive administrative powers, they soon busied themselves
getting rich.
25

Ruiz, p. 116.
Particularly in the New World, the office of gobernador replaced the office of adelantado, which, as mentioned
above, slowly lost power and eventually turned into an honorific title.
27
Lunenfeld, p. 22
26
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Shortly thereafter, the usual transition from conquest to consolidation followed. The Crown
was at first able to enforce its interests in the islands and repress rebellions through the
gobernadores. Then, as fighting slowly ended, Isabela sent corregidores to control governors
who had become overly exploitative of the Guanches. 28 However, distance and poor
communications defeated her efforts, and corregidores eventually became equally abusive. Only
direct royal intervention, it seemed, could end the abuses and corruption of recalcitrant officials.
This was usually slow in coming. This is a history that would be repeated in the Americas.

In short, the unique circumstances of the Iberian Peninsula - the Reconquista, internal
factional wars, and large and visible religious minorities - encouraged Castilian elites to develop
an ethos based on war and military prowess, mostly directed against the Muslim enemy. The
concessions the Crown had been forced to give to independent minded aristocrats and cities
during its long struggle had made medieval Iberia a fractious and contested space. The Crown
had never been at ease with its aristocracy or town elites, since it frequently faced challenges
from them. It had needed military leaders to defeat Muslins, and it also had had to reward them.
But these then used their wealth and influence to solidify their own positions in newly conquered
regions, turning themselves into an even greater obstacle to the Crown’s desire for an orderly,
tax-paying, and loyal kingdom. Adelantados and nobility alike had taken advantage of their
positions to enrich themselves. It was only when peace and some sense of order had been
achieved that monarchs could try to tame their own warrior elites.

28

In some cases, governors were recalled and dismissed. Such was the case of Juan Rejon. Some, like Pedro
Fernandez de Algaba, were even killed by other Castilians.
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This had obliged them to raise up layer upon layer of royal officials. Although initially loyal
to the Crown, as each became more independent and recalcitrant, a new group had to be created
to bring the previous one under control. Being themselves appointed by the Crown, these
officials were usually an imposition on the localities they were meant to govern, and seldom
represented any desire for autonomy coming from the locals they administered. Exploitative of
those below them, and antagonistic to those above, they were entirely self-serving, and
ultimately disruptive.
The conquest and administration of the New World would witness an extension of these
same relationships. The old model of adelantados would be used to grant governorships to those
who were successful in the Americas. 29 In addition, expeditions to explore and conquer parts of
the Americas were modeled on earlier wars against the Moors, as soldiers of high rank and
experience were encouraged to recruit their own armies, and go in search of riches, settling new
towns along the way. The institution of the encomienda mirrored the arrangements of
adelantados on the Muslim frontier, and the repartimientos in the Americas were similar to the
ones after successful military campaigns in Iberia. The conquest of the New World was achieved
by Spaniards who were then given titles and dominion at the expense of the conquered. It was a
pattern that they had long become used to.
The model of New World administration thus owed much to the Reconquista and the
centralization of power by the Castilian Crown, particularly during the sixteenth century. The
Iberian Peninsula had witnessed the unfolding of a unique dynamic, born out of an identity based
on military ethos and religious exceptionalism that found expression in the opposition of
29
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recalcitrant elites to the monarchy. These attitudes were later transferred to the Americas. The
evolution of institutions of Spanish America was thus a replication of the painful centuries-long
consolidation of power of the Castilian Crown.

3. The New Kingdom of Granada: Encomienda, the City and its Hinterland
The process of expansion and political centralization, transferred to the New World, created
the Spanish colonial empire of Charles V and Phillip II. Just as during the Reconquista and
invasion of the Canary Islands, the conquest of the Americas would not be financed exclusively
by the monarchy. Most of it was done by private funding. 30 Expeditions were contracted with
adelantados, who were then granted the office of gobernador. 31 Every conquest and looted
treasure wetted the appetite of these adelantados and their armies of conquistadors for more, and
drove them on to search for new kingdoms and riches. As an extension of the expeditions that
conquered the Incas, and searched for “El Dorado,” 32 Spaniards headed towards the eastern
Andean highlands of present-day Colombia, where they found a temperate climate and fertile
plateau. There they also discovered the Muisca culture, the most complex and densely populated
pre-Columbian society of northern South America. Following a much-repeated pattern of
30
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settlement, the Spanish defeated the Muisca, stole their gold, and established towns near
populated areas. The most significant urban centers of New Granada - Bogota, Tunja, and Velez
- were founded among the Muisca. Bogota and Tunja were later to become regional centers of
power, with the former emerging as the colonial capital of the Nuevo Reino de Granada (New
Kingdom of Granada), encompassing modern central Colombia.
The consolidation of the conquest then followed. While not exactly like the Reconquista, it
was certainly inspired by the latter. After conquering the local population, repartimientos were
distributed among conquistadors according to rank. The bringing of additional settlers from
Iberia across the Atlantic remained, however, an insurmountable problem in the short term —
and a very considerable one later on. In order to firmly establish their authority, the Castilians
therefore had to adapt to local conditions. The solution, following the settling of towns, was the
creation of the encomienda, the most important institution in the early colonies.
The Spanish exercised political and cultural hegemony through towns that were the seats of
the legal bodies that governed the provinces. They were intended primarily to stabilize and
regularize authority over the hinterland. As such, they were the foci of power and status, the
centers from which the extraction of mineral wealth and farm production was organized and
controlled (they also came in time to be centers of groups that did not exist in Spain, such as
Indians, slaves, and Spaniards born in the colonies —creoles. 33) Finally, towns radiated the
cultural influences that created a Hispanicized New World. But unlike so many European towns,
they never grew up organically as centers of artisanal manufacturing or trade. In this regard, they
were artificial creations meant to serve administrative, not commercial, purposes.
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It was the encomienda, however, that made the economic exploitation of the colonies
possible. Since the primary purpose of the empire was profit, it was central to all other Spanish
institutions and activities. During the early decades of empire, the encomienda allowed Spaniards
who held them to exploit the labor of Indian populations that was ultimately the source of
colonial wealth. It also provided them with the money and power necessary to remain at the
pinnacle of society. Through the encomienda Spanish elites would even attempt to dominate the
colonial administration by challenging royal officials whose functions were not always explicitly
defined. 34
Most importantly, the urban centers and the encomienda fixed the socioeconomic identity of
the colonies in ways that continue to influence Latin American republics today. Both grew
simultaneously, since one could not exist without the other. Then, as the encomienda started to
decline due to the dramatic reduction of the native population, the resguardo appeared as an
alternative method of governing the hinterland. But whether through encomiendas or resguardos,
Spaniards maintained access to the labor and production of thousands of Indians scattered across
the countryside. The encomienda first, and then the resguardo, in turn reinforced the position of
the cities as centers of power and status
Mirroring the developments in fourteenth and fifteenth century Castile, the initial stages of
the conquest and consolidation had been determined by conquistadors without much peninsular
intervention. This eventually changed when the Crown and the Council of the Indies started to
assert royal authority through the creation of Viceroyalties, audiencias, and new gobiernos
during the middle of the sixteenth century. This produced the inevitable conflicts between the
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local conquering elites and royal authority born out of the attempt of the Spanish Crown to create
an orderly and well-governed colonial society. 35

The Encomienda
The encomienda (literally: “to entrust”), bestowed in the form of grants, was the right to
receive tribute and labor from Indians entrusted to conquistadors in a specified area as a reward
for service. Their size was dependent upon an individual’s position in the army. The recipient,
the encomendero, promised to pacify and protect the Indians, and supervise their conversion to
Christianity. A parish priest was chosen by him to oversee the teaching of Christian doctrine.
Tribute could take the form of agricultural produce, textiles, or labor. 36 In order to ensure the
efficiency of this rough and ready institution, encomenderos relied on other Indians, called
caciques, who became central to the system. In the first years after the conquest, this office was
filled by many of the old indigenous nobility, since their experience and prestige made it easier
to induce Indians to work.
The encomienda seemed a reasonable solution to many of the problems faced by the
Spanish. The Muisca, like many of the sedentary, hierarchical tribes in the Americas, did not
have the same attitudes towards work, land, and property as sixteenth century Europeans. They
had never before worked for wages, nor did they own land as private property. 37 Like other pre-
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Columbian peoples, their economic efforts were largely communal in nature, inspired and
justified by religious rituals that were directed by the nobility and the tribe’s chief or priest. 38
The religious justification for the entire system had been essential, since the chief/priest mediated
between the community and the gods, gathering and redistributing production in the form of
divine tribute. In addition, a system of mandatory labor already existed in some pre-Columbian
societies, like the Inca mit’a (in Quechua), used in community-driven projects such as roads
construction or communal farming. Because of the importance of the gold and silver flowing to
Europe, the Spanish adopted the mit’a as a labor obligation. The mita was thus turned into a
corvée system that required Indian communities in encomiendas to provide a percentage of their
male population, called mitayos, for seasonal labor in mines, farms, or on public works,
sometimes hundreds of miles away from their homes. 39 They were also forced into all kinds of
additional activities that kept the entire imperial system running. The encomienda and mita gave
the Spaniards a means to consolidate their conquest and regulate the exploitation of the Indian
population at little cost without entirely changing the pre-Columbian social hierarchy.
During the Reconquista, the Crown had offered victorious captains political office,
privileges, and the right to extract tribute from rich Muslim and Jewish populations. Special
privileges in addition had also been granted to those who wanted to establish towns near the
ever-expanding frontier, thereby applying further pressure on the Muslim enemy. But Iberian
lands were never as rich in natural resources as those in the New World and, unlike Muslim
lands, were not immediately depopulated by their original inhabitants. The encomienda was thus

Coatsworth, pp. 256-261. The Indians did not contest the Spanish ownership of land, but rather their own
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an adaptation of Castilian Reconquista institutions to the conditions of the New World. Rather
than transferring populations (a largely impossible task), those already living on the land were
reduced to a kind of serfdom. In the eyes of the Castilian monarchy, which strongly opposed
using baptized natives as slaves, Indians were free vassals of the Crown and legal owners of the
land on which they lived and worked. It was only their tribute that was the property of the
Crown. At the same time, the monarchy needed to give something to its victorious captains,
many of whom had invested heavily in financing the conquest and now expected generous
rewards, without endangering paramount royal authority.
The encomienda answered both these problems. First, it gave a few hundred Spaniards the
opportunity to control vast spaces and many thousands of Indians for their own benefit, to exploit
their labor, and accumulate wealth. It also secured the Crown’s (at least theoretical) control of
the conquistadors. 40 Because the natives’ tribute was the property of the monarchy, Indians and
their tribute were only temporarily “entrusted” to the conquerors. The encomienda obliged
Spaniards to supervise the Indians’ conversion to Christianity, to respect their lands, and to
refrain from enslaving them. In short, the Crown “authorized and taxed, but also protected. The
conquerors pillaged and profited, but also governed”. 41 All of this was designed to encourage
Spaniards to continue to come to the New World, win power and status through conquest, and
send vast amounts of wealth back to Europe. 42 Belief in the morality of this system required a
great deal of wishful thinking; less generous observers might have called it both odious and
cynical.
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The reality of the encomienda was of course much more brutal. Its legal structure, and the
rights of encomenderos, which were never clearly defined, contributed greatly to the exploitation
of the indigenous people. 43 Some of this was the fault of the Crown. Being the absolute owner of
the land, it had attempted to avoid the factional divisions that had emerged during the
Reconquista by reserving the right to reclaim grants at will. 44 Monarchs did not want to foster
the growth of a powerful colonial feudal class similar to the one that had impeded royal power in
Iberia, and which might openly defy their authority. As a result, the Crown always kept some
encomiendas for itself, and imposed several other legal restrictions. Since encomiendas were
rights to labor but not their land, they were not transferrable. Theoretically, Indians could not be
bought, sold, or rented, nor could they be relocated. Moreover, the Crown prevented these grants
from being inherited beyond the second generation. 45 The encomenderos of New Granada were
not as grand as those in Peru and Mexico, where encomiendas had many thousands of Indians.
Nonetheless, the absence of a strong central authority that could enforce the law, and the
fragmented geography of New Granada, allowed isolated encomenderos to use their Indians as
they wished by ignoring royal restrictions with impunity.
The system encouraged encomenderos to mercilessly exploit natives by extracting as much
labor and tribute as possible before their grants were either taken away or expired. This did not
discourage other Spaniards from coming to the New World looking for their Indians with which
to extract the wealth of the New World, rather than working themselves to produce it. The
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indigenous populations were in no position to withstand them. 46 They had to work for their own
subsistence, fulfill their tribute obligations, serve in encomenderos’ residences, mines, and farms,
and pay tithes for the maintenance of the Church, duties Spaniards never had to fulfill.
Moreover, encomenderos used their leverage to illegally demand still more from Indians “…with
the approval of colonial officials, and with a repressive systemic logic that appeared normal [to
Spaniards]”. 47 In short, the entire colonial economy, and society’s very survival, depended
almost entirely on Indian labor. There was very little to ease their burdens.
Gold mining areas were the sites of the greatest exploitation. Mining centers were
nowhere near Bogota and Tunja, but Spaniards living in these cities had considerable
investments in them, and relocated mitayos were forced to work there. For example,
Mariquita (founded 1551), located about 100 miles northeast of Bogota near the Magdalena
River, controlled important mining centers, and saw extensive use of mitayos from the
hinterland of Bogota and Tunja. 48 The most important mining areas were located in the
Popayan jurisdiction, which included Cartago, Buga, and Pasto (all modern-day Colombian
towns. 49) The need for labor encouraged encomenderos, gobernadores, and corregidores to
shift and displace Indians at their pleasure. When this over worked, rapidly dwindling
mitayo labor force proved insufficient, proximity to Cartagena and Panama allowed
46

One of the very few advantages natives living in the highlands had was that European diseases did not thrive
there. As a result, indigenous populations survived in higher proportions than those in the low lands. Spaniards
never brought in many slaves into the Andes.
47
German Colmenares, “La Economia y La Sociedad Coloniales, 1550-1800” (Colonial Economy and Society,
1550-1800), in Cobo Borda J.G. & Mutis Duran, S. (Eds.) Manual de Historia de Colombia, Volumen 1, (Instituto
Colombiano de Cultura, Bogota, Colombia, 1982): 289.
48
Salomon Kalmonovitz, La Economia de la Nueva Granada (The Economy of New Granada) (Universidad Jorge
Tadeo Lozano, Bogota, Colombia, 2008), p. 34. For a detailed discussion of mining in Mariquita see Armando
Moreno Sandoval, Mineria y Sociedad en la Jurisdiccion de Mariquita: Reales de Minas de Las Lajas y Santa Ana:
1543-1651 (Mining and Society in Mariquita Jurisdiction: Royal Mines in Las Lajas and Santa Ana: 1543-1651)
(Universidad del Tolima, Ibague, Colombia, 2006).
49
For an overview of Greater Quito´s gold mining at the turn of the 17th century, which also overlapped with New
Granada jurisdictions, see Kris Lane, Quito, 1599: City and Colony in Transition (University of New Mexico Press,
Albuquerque, NM, 2002), pp. 119-145.

23

Spaniards to import African slaves, particularly in low land mining areas, all with the
permission of the Council of the Indies and the Crown. 50
Emerging as practically the only way to accumulate wealth in the first decades after the
conquest, and resting on the military authority of the leaders of the expeditions who granted
them, the distribution of encomiendas was a source of great contention amongst Spaniards.
Those who had come during the first wave of conquest benefitted the most, along with
gobernadores. These formed their own factions, carefully protecting their position against all
who felt cheated, including new settlers who came asking for their own share of Indian labor, or
“to be fed” in the parlance of the time. 51 All were looking for natives to make themselves rich.
Far from having anything to contribute, they were inherently parasitic, drawn by the gold rush,
get rich quick atmosphere typical of economies based on mineral wealth rather than on creative
entrepreneurship. In the conditions of the New World, the Castilian ethos of acquiring status and
wealth through conquest and of despising manual labor was exacerbated.
Successive government attempts to enforce measures to protect the natives created
additional Spanish discontent. 52 Reforms had been prompted by pressure from peninsular
intellectuals and priests such as Bartolome de Las Casas. They were fiercely resisted by
encomienda owners, who at the same time were fighting the efforts of royal officials to reduce
the size of their grants. In this encomenderos were eventually largely successful. Control was
weakened by the corruption of the corregidores and other royal officials whose tenures were
long enough to allow them to join with powerful creole families, giving them incentives to
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despoil others by confiscating encomiendas around Bogota and Tunja for their own benefit and
those of their friends. 53 Even when the Crown wanted to punish transgressors, the process could
take months. It eventually became clear that vigorous royal intervention to bring encomenderos
under control had ironically encouraged them to extract as much tribute as they could as quickly
as possible. Royal attempts to protect Indians had only made their condition worse.
In short, the attempt to centralize royal power in fourteenth and fifteenth century Castile was
largely replicated in the New World. The Crown sent officials to rein in the power of an
increasingly quasi-feudal colonial elite, while at the same time attempting to strengthen the
colonial bureaucracy. Yet the Crown soon saw many of its agents slip from its control. It is only
at this point that the process began to deviate from the Iberian experience. The Spanish Crown
could not afford to lose control of the colonies, and the elites there enjoyed the distinct advantage
of being far from the metropole. Since the monarchy could do very little to get at them, it
relented in its effort to reduce the encomiendas, eventually allowing the institution to operate
outside strict royal control. At a time when the peninsular aristocracy was being subdued, a
colonial elite was being allowed to become entrenched.
Then, just as the encomienda had become institutionalized as a “fundamental tool to dictate
relationships between Indians and settlers”, 54 the Indian population began to decline so
drastically it could no longer perform the obligations imposed on it. As a result, the encomienda
started to decline as the economic mainstay of empire. Unbowed by royal pressure, it was
defeated by demographics. This process was accompanied by the rise of a class of free
individuals of mixed race (mestizos) and ambiguous status who were not bound by the same
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labor and tribute obligations as natives, and who would gradually come to make up a
considerable proportion of the colonial population.
In order to prevent the tribute paying population from disappearing altogether, the
authorities were forced to remake encomiendas, eliminate unproductive ones, and transfer the
surviving natives into Indian reserves, or “resguardos”, as they were known in New Granada.
Most encomiendas eventually fell under the direct administration of the Crown. But even as the
encomienda was being slowly replaced, it had already cemented the institutionalized
subordination of all economic activities to a hierarchy of privileged people whose position was
based on conquest and coercion. 55 It was inevitable therefore that the resguardo soon
approximated the same old conditions of exploitation and abuse.
Resguardos slowly evolved into proper Indian towns, with institutions that mirrored those of
Spanish origin. At the same time, they struggled to maintain a clear demarcation between
Spaniards and the rest — a Republica de Indios as opposed to a Republica de Españoles
envisioned by the Crown. Before examining the rise of this new arrangement, however, it is
essential to examine key features of the original colonial urban centers.

4. Urbanization: The Spanish Colonial Model
The encomienda was the main instrument for the accumulation of wealth, but it was the
colonial cities that were the real bases from which Spanish cultural and political influence
spread. The Spanish vision of urbanization was derived from several historic models, including
the Greek agro-urban community or polis; the Roman civilizing civitas; the Augustinian vision
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of the City of God; and the urban settlements that were either taken from Muslims, or
established on the frontiers of Christian Spain during the seven-century-long Reconquista. 56
These were supposed to be centers whose influence would acculturate their inhabitants, and
those in the surrounding countryside, to Spanish Catholic civilization. This method, originally
designed to transform the identity of Iberian populations, was then transferred to the Americas. 57
“The urban unit was a microcosm of a larger imperial and ecclesiastical order, and responsibility
for its proper functioning lay not with private consciences but with the discretion of bureaucratic,
latifundary, and ecclesiastical notables”. 58 This was fundamental in defining the nature of
urbanization in the first two centuries throughout Spanish America. It was also through cities that
the monarchy outlined territorial jurisdiction and boundaries; controlled the pacification,
acculturation, and religious conversion of the native population; and supervised the economic
management of the colonies.
Urbanization was a highly effective means of control. A town did not have to be big; it just
needed to have certain necessary elements (none of which were of an economic nature) — a
governor, a cabildo (town council), vecinos (citizens), encomiendas, and of course, a
surrounding Indian population. The cabildo was established first, created by the highest ranking
conquistadors, and was the institution in charge of jurisdictional matters, designation of lots and
parcels, economic and infrastructure management, and assignment of expeditions to explore and
conquer new territories. 59 Given that cities were to be the most important foci of military and
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economic control, many members of the elite did not permanently establish residence in only
one, and towns functioned as way stations for restless Spaniards, just as during the Reconquista.
Thus, many of the conquistadors who founded Bogota did not stay; instead, a significant number
moved on to start other towns, as well as to establish mining operations deep in the
countryside. 60 Regardless, the cities of Spanish America, their governors and their cabildos were
the main centers for administration, even if it was only with time that cities came to include
many permanent residents. 61 “It was the town upon which the Spanish Crown and colonizers
alike depended for establishing jurisdictional legitimation, organization of the economy, and
perhaps most importantly defense of trading routes, commercial exchange, and protection of
frontier regions.” 62 In practice, Spanish colonial towns resembled “North American counties
more than cities,” 63 since they lay claim to tens or even hundreds of miles of territory around
them with dozens of encomiendas and mitas.
Encomenderos had originally occupied the important offices in municipal administrations. 64
Since the competition for Indian labor and resources that caused deep divisions and conflicts
amongst Spaniards were adjudicated in the towns, the first decades of colonization placed cities
in a terribly vulnerable position. The dispute between Almagro and Pizarro over jurisdiction of
Cuzco and the Indian labor that surrounded it is well known, and resulted in what almost became
a minor civil war against the Crown in the 1540s. There were additional conflicts between
Jimenez de Quesada, Federman and Belalcazar, all of whom had led the conquest of modern day
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Colombia and Ecuador. Once royal officials were sent to the New Kingdom of Granada,
ostensibly to rein in the power of encomenderos, they too began to compete for labor for their
own profit, generating still more strife between the original settlers and the Crown. 65
As mentioned above, the conquest was consolidated and towns originally created without
royal intervention. By the middle of the sixteenth century, however, peninsular authorities had
begun to exert greater control with the creations of Audiencias. While conflicts between Crown
and local elites never entirely abated, Audiencias at least defined each city´s jurisdiction over its
hinterland in a clear and precise way. The city-hinterland relationship was further rationalized by
the proclaimed official primacy of the urban center. 66 It was for this reason that the vice regal
capitals of Mexico City and Lima occupied the highest place in the colonies. These were the
homes of the most important colonial officials, and administrative and ecclesiastical offices. The
vice royalties were then subdivided into Audiencias: New Spain included the Audiencias of
Mexico, Havana, Santo Domingo, Guatemala, Guadalajara, and even Manila in the Philippines;
the Viceroyalty of Peru included the audiencias of Santa Fe (Bogota), Quito, Panama, Charcas
(La Plata), and Concepcion (Chile). These were further divided into gobiernos such as
Guayaquil, Popayan, Cartagena, and Tunja, which were in turn broken up into corregimientos.
Each of these possessed a cabildo. Every settlement, town, or village in the Spanish colonial
empire was thus subordinate to a city in the following order: vice-regal capital -> audiencia ->
gobierno -> corregimiento. The royal Cedula (decree) of 1549 carefully defining Bogota as the
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audiencia of Santa Fe (and capital of New Granada) eleven years after its founding, was typical
of the way both the city’s administrative area, and duties of its royal officials, were delineated: 67
In Santa Fé de Bogotá in the New Kingdom of Granada shall reside another royal
audiencia and chancery, with a president, governor and captain general….. (and) will
have for districts the provinces … of Santa Marta, Río de San Juan, and of Popayan,
except those places of the latter which are marked for the royal audiencia of Quito;
and of Guyana, or El Dorado, it shall have (all that) is not in the audiencia of
Hispaniola, and all the province of Cartagena; sharing borders on the south with said
audiencia of Quito and any undiscovered lands, on the west and north with the North
Sea and the provinces which belong to the royal audiencia of Hispaniola, on the west
with the one of Tierra Firme (Panama). And we order that the governor and captain
general of said provinces and president of their royal audiencia, … (assign)
the repartimiento of Indians and other offices that need to be appointed, and attend to
all the matters and business that belong to the government, and that the oidores
(judges) of said audiencia do not interfere with this, and (see that all) matters of
justice provided for and sentenced (are) carried out. 68

The fact that most of the cities and mining centers defined in this and similar cedulas had
already been created decades before the decrees suggests that conflicts between cities for natives
and resources were prevalent until the audiencias established distinct jurisdictions. It should also
be noted, however, that the farther away a town was from its directing superior city, the more
autonomy it had. The case of Popayan is particularly revealing, since it was located near
important gold fields. Standing between Bogota and Quito, its elites developed a testy
relationship with both audiencia capitals (Popayan’s rivalry with Bogota would last until well
into the nineteenth century, when Cali surpassed it in importance. 69)
Any new exploration or economic development within its jurisdictional boundaries had to
first be approved by the city. The authority of the encomienda-dominated cabildos and their
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influence over their hinterlands was thus undermined by the audiencia officials and colonial
authorities, who were outside of the town council. The most important of these were the newly
appointed governors who ruled entire provinces 70 (and who were sometimes called audiencia
presidents). As a result, the granting of land, the division of Indian labor between encomiendas
and mitas, and the late sixteenth century reorganization of encomiendas into resguardos, was
largely done by the audiencia presidents following the advice of oidores and visitadores, who
supervised settlers and their activities in the colonies. The latter were similar to Castilian
residencia officials - agents appointed by the Crown to supervise corregidores. The authority of
audiencia governors was naturally much stronger in the audiencia capitals, where they and other
colonial administrators lived. 71 The fact that cabildo officers would eventually come from creole
families, while colonial officials continued to come from Spain, created an important source of
tension between the two powerful groups.

5. Resguardos
Old World diseases, relentless exploitation, and displacement of the native population
eventually threatened to create a demographic catastrophe. Already by the 1560s the numbers of
indigenous people in many areas were too small to sustain the burdens placed on them. Since
they were the primary generators of wealth, something had to be done. The Crown, which had
only timidly interfered with encomiendas, now felt the need to impose its rule more forcefully.
As a result, the audiencias intervened and reorganized the countryside by dismantling
70
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unproductive encomiendas, relocating the Indian population, and organizing them in new
resguardos (or reduciones, literally reductions) in order to “protect” them. These were proper
Indian towns over which corregidores were assigned. 72 They were at least theoretically supposed
to copy the organization of Spanish urban centers. The main towns were called cabeceras
(literally, the head towns), with all other pueblos (towns) being subject to it. 73 Indians were thus
brought into a more controlled environment forbidden to all non-Indian groups, but from which
labor and tribute could continue to be extracted, and the mitayo demands of mining centers
satisfied. The Crown assumed control of resguardos and tribute, always reserving the right to
assign and remove land from them.
In theory, the natives enjoyed the usufruct of the land on which they lived, but could never
own it (because of this they would eventually lose it). This was a major change from their earlier
status as landowning quasi-serfs. They now had as little claim to the soil as their former
encomienda exploiters. While land use was restricted to Indians, they were not permitted to rent,
lease, or sell it, since this was deemed a threat to their ability to produce. Caciques and Indian
officials in charge of resguardos were responsible for managing collective tribute and labor
obligations demanded by the elites and colonial administration. 74 Just as on the encomiendas,
Indians could only use the land of the resguardos for two purposes: to produce tribute for the
Spaniards and the Church, and to sustain themselves. They were never allowed to engage in
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commercial agriculture. Precisely because the resguardo kept the tribute and labor systems in
place, the institution did little to protect Indian populations from continuing abuses and
encroachments. Moreover, Indians and caciques ignored the official rules and proceeded to rent
out portions of resguardo lands to mestizos and Spaniards in order to shift part of their tributary
burdens to renters. These were then allowed to live among Indians in resguardos without
punishment. 75
The system at first had greatly strengthened the position of the caciques, who, as mentioned
above, had been the legal mediators between Spaniards and natives living in encomiendas. It
had been a relationship that had worked well for them and their families, since they were
exempted from the obligation of lower status Indians. They used their position to achieve wealth
and influence within their communities (there are several examples of wealthy cacique families
surviving well into the seventeenth century. 76) Caciques were often even more exploitative than
Spaniards. 77 However, Indian towns eventually saw the creation of municipal institutions similar
to those of their Spanish counterparts, such as cabildos and alcaldes (mayors), and even the
emergence of Indian vecinos who could vote in cabildo meetings. In the highly competitive
Spanish empire, Indian cabildos, once established, began to struggle for tribute and labor with
the caciques, and eventually won.
These in turn began to be superseded by audiencias and sundry colonial officials. Most
important among them were corregidores. The Crown had intended to use them to replace
encomenderos as rulers of the hinterland. They were the newest group of bureaucrats intended to
oversee the orderly urbanization of the indigenous peoples. The Indian cabildos, while enjoying
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control over most matters within their communities, had previously been subordinate to
encomenderos and priests. Now they were under the supervision of corregidores, who by law
were supposed to protect them, but who, along with encomenderos, priests, (and later
landowners and free mestizos), began to exploit them in their turn. 78
The implementation of the resguardos continued the process that had begun with the
encomienda of subordinating the hinterland to urban political centers. Central to this was the
conversion of the natives to Catholicism, for it is through religion that “the Spaniards made their
most determined effort to modify Indian society.” 79 Conversions were at first in the hands of
encomederos and their descendants who possessed legal power to dispatch missionaries, and
were obliged to pay for the services of a priest. This meant giving clergy their “fair” share of
Indian labor and tribute so that their enterprise would be properly funded. Spanish clergy were
then sent to live amongst the local people, first on encomiendas, and then in resguardos during
the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
This process was initiated by and enforced from the cities, where the most powerful elites
lived. The encomiendas and resguardos merely served as functional centers for local clergy and
rural officials. “For the Spanish, the acculturation of Indians meant to impose on them an order,
´ponerlos en policia´ (to police them) … while for the Spanish, the city, civitas, was the nucleus
of civilization… where law, order, and morality blossomed.” 80 Pacification and acculturation
went hand in hand with conversion. In fact, without conversion to Spanish Catholicism, it is
doubtful that any Indian community would have enjoyed any peace at all.
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There was no better way to indoctrinate natives than to introduce patron saints into their
communities. A patron saint’s feast day was cause for great celebration. Led by their clergy,
many towns used these festivals competitively to show their greater religiosity than their
neighbors, hoping in this way to gain the favor of the powerful city based bishops. 81 It became
axiomatic that the nearer Indians were to a major city, the more easily they were Hispanicized.
Those who emigrated to cities lost their pre-Colombian cultural and religious practices much
faster than those in outlying areas.
Whether the Crown favored peaceful or military strategies, Spanish encomenderos,
landowners, and miners, benefited from “just war” since it provided them cheap labor through
Indian captives and slaves; raids against small non-pacified Indian tribes were prevalent
throughout the entire colonial period. 82 In the Audiencia of Bogota these tribes populated
pockets of resistance in the highlands, but there were large sections of unpacified areas that
required large investments in missions and expeditions from the main urban centers. In fact,
given the vast amounts of land claimed by cities, there were areas of cultural and violent
resistance that continued to be a thorn to Spanish settlers up until Republican years, and many
peripheral encomiendas and resguardos were the source of multiple reports of obstinate Indians
who refused to accept the “true” religion. 83 (There was strong historical precedent for this.
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Christian conversions in the late Roman Empire had been more easily achieved in cities.
Traditional beliefs had survived far longer in the countryside, far away from the main urban
centers, as they later did in encomiendas and resguardos. The pejorative term “pagan” is after all
simply Latin for a country dweller.)
The process of Christianization, supervised by bishops and audiencia officials in
Bogota, also facilitated economic exploitation, and especially the running of the mines that
were always the main source of colonial wealth. The chief concern of the audiencia was that
Indians pay their tribute and provide labor for the Crown, resguardos and encomiendas. The
bishops’ main desire was that they pay tithes and sustain clergy with food and labor. The
local elites simply wanted them to work in the fields and mines. “The Christianization of the
native communities was (therefore) understood not (merely) as the adoption of new beliefs,
but rather as the imposition of a new discipline, familial networks, and systems of
production, all of which forced (indigenous people) to fulfil their obligations despite laws
protecting them, in the midst of a population demise caused by constant migration to urban
centers, increasing “mestizaje”, and most crucially, death due to exploitation and
diseases”. 84 As long as the urban elites residing in cities were satisfied with the wealth
flowing to them (as well as the quinto demanded by the Crown), abuses in the hinterland
were of no great concern.
At the same time, there was a curious tension at the heart of the Spanish colonial
empire, and which was almost entirely foreign to the British colonies of North America.
Unlike the Protestant settler colonies of the north, the Spanish never consciously aimed at
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pushing the indigenous inhabitants aside. They needed their labor to work in the mines.
Protestant dissenters in New England and elsewhere wanted to clear the land so they could
work it themselves. The notion of coming to the New World to actually work, as opposed to
getting rich at the expense of Indian labor, was something largely unknown to immigrants to
the Spanish imperium. Once it was established that indigenous labor was a necessary
component to getting rich, their pacification through religious conversion became of prime
importance. The cynicism of this was tempered by the sincere religious convictions and
commitment of Catholic missionaries. As one modern author has noted, “there was a central
tension within the logic of the Spanish imperium: how to guarantee a sufficient labor force
for the colonial economy and yet protect as well as Christianize the native population.’’ 85
Still, there was considerable corruption and exploitation even within the missionary
effort. Part of this was the result of jurisdictional competing claims. Parishes had been
created for ecclesiastical purposes, but they did not always coincide with the jurisdictions of
corregimientos and encomiendas. 86 As a result Indian communities were sometimes obliged
to provide tribute and labor twice over, in addition to supporting their own communities.
Other abuses were more sinister. Where priests were actually available, they frequently
requested land from urban cabildos and audiencias, depending on who had authority over
which district. Since they did not always have legal access to Indian labor, they often forced
women and children to work for them. 87 Another notable example of corruption was the use
of the cofradia (sodality), religious confraternities that financed and managed “chapels,
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masses, festivals and charities, as well as land and other properties of the church.” 88 These
sodalities were supported by Indian members of the community, but in many cases, became
sources of embezzlement for corregidores and priests with the complicity of Indian
cabildos. Where missionaries and priests were lacking, encomenderos and royal officials
would even send their own minions to pass as clergy in order to collect tithes for
themselves. 89 Bishops were unable to do much about this, given their lack of manpower.
Whether through the encomienda or resguardo, it seemed that Spanish colonial rule was
only capable of producing successive layers of parasitical and predatory officials that the
monarchy was unable to control. Royal authority could be much more easily exercised in
Iberia. Following Charles V’s crushing of urban rebellions in the War of the Communes
(1520-1521), the Crown had remained firmly in control of its vassals and officials. But royal
power, separated from the colonies by the broad expanse of the Atlantic, remained both
distant and weak. Since it was unthinkable that the monarch would send an army to the New
World to make war on his own subjects (especially when they were successfully managing
what were still enormous numbers of indigenous inhabitants), there was little Charles, his
son Philip II, or their successors, could do. Royal intervention for the protection of Indians
was therefore sporadic, and being clearly unsuccessful, ultimately insincere. As long as the
Habsburgs received the quinto (the fifth of all mine output) that allowed them to fight the
Ottomans or Protestants in the Holy Roman Empire and the Netherlands, they were willing
to allow colonists and their own corrupt officials to run the empire as they wished.

From Resguardo to Hacienda
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When natives were put in resguardos, their displacement left many plots of land
“abandoned.” Spanish elites that had previously never been allowed to own land outside of their
towns of residence now jumped at the opportunity to acquire this newly available ground. 90
They then went even further, pressuring visitadores and corregidores to consolidate resguardos
further in order to open up more land for sale (not coincidentally, this began at a time when
Indians had begun to try to defend themselves against encroachments. 91) Grants of temporary
ownership were first given through contracts called “mercedes” (mercies), by which the Crown
temporarily ceded title as long as it was used productively. 92 However, with the tributary
population declining, and poor whites and mestizos petitioning to own land themselves, the elites
hastened to use their influence to claim most mercedes, while subsequently using their position
to use the land any way they wished. Threatened by the near disappearance of free labor, the
elites cajoled the audiencia to sell them title to legal ownership of mercedes without the
confirmation of the Crown in contracts called composiciones (compositions). All those who
occupied land and claimed it as their own were prompted to pay a “composicion” before a
colonial judge, to be then confirmed by the Audiencia. 93 Since only the elites had direct access to
colonial officials, audiencias and gobiernos mercedes and composiciones were decided in their
favor, bypassing poor Spaniards, mestizos, and Indians still hoping to keep their lands. 94 In this
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way, the greater part of the ground around resguardos was taken by the audiencia on behalf of
the Crown, and then slowly given to the new hacienda elite. Even more remarkably, land
occupied by poor Spaniards and mestizos eventually ended up inside the mercedes and
composiciones.
Unable to influence the institutional machinery, most mestizos and poor Spaniards were then
forced to renegotiate their position with the new landowners, becoming either renters, or, if
unable to do so, workers on the new haciendas. Those small-scale farmers who tried to hold on
found they could not compete with the great estates. They were ultimately forced to sell their
land and move to the towns, or else become farm laborers. In attempting to protect Indians, the
monarchy had only reinforced their economic submission by depriving them of the soil. All royal
good intentions were defeated by rapacious creole elites and corrupt officials. And since the
Crown had never recognized the Indians’ right to own resguardo land, they received no
compensation when it was assigned or sold to others.
Ultimately, the Crown’s attempts to alleviate abuses of the Indian population proved futile.
Its efforts to separate the white Spanish population from the indigenous population proved
equally unsuccessful. 95 This was because of the appearance of a new group - the mestizos. These
had been made inevitable by Spanish colonial policy. Emigration to the colonies from the
beginning had been severely restricted. Only Castilians had been allowed to enter, since those
from southern Spain had been considered tainted by possible Jewish or Moorish blood. Since
those willing to embark on New World adventures were almost invariably young men, the
inevitable mixed-race children began to appear soon after their arrival (it is estimated that out of
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55,000 immigrants to the New Granada from 1493 to 1600, only 18.4% were women). 96 Since
pre-Columbian societies had long been used to the concubines that surrounded elite males, the
sexual subordination of women to men of higher social status was nothing new to indigenous
people. 97 In colonial society their offspring would always carry the stigma of illegitimacy. But
they also lacked a clear place within the older established social hierarchy. This was the source
of their relative freedom.
All of this contributed to a remarkable and fundamental transformation of economic
relationships. This was the rise of a new free holding, land owning elite that had practically
been unknown during the first century of Spanish America. The hacienda now became the
most important economic unit in the colonies. While the encomienda continued to provide
its owners prestige but little else, hacienda owners expanded their holdings and solidified
their position as the political and economic elite with the energy and aggressiveness of the
new rich. Many of them used their profits to invest in mining ventures and slaves to work
them, just as encomenderos had done earlier. This new class of landowners now also offered
mestizos the opportunity to work for wages, thus creating a new class of low wage laborers
free from tribute obligations. An earlier, quasi-manorial system, with a warrior land-holding
elite dependent on serf labor, was giving way to a modern, land-owning class employing
free labor that was no longer bound to the land, or obligated to provide corvee labor in the
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mines and fields. These dynamics resulted in the blurring of the rigid lines created by
Spaniards to keep an ordered society.
Yet despite all this, the perennial subordination of rural areas to the cities was perpetuated. 98
With mercedes and composiciones, the elites had successfully maintained the status quo,
strengthening their position within the social hierarchy. More importantly, they compensated
themselves for the loss of their legal claim to tributary labor in encomiendas and resguardos by
the ruthless coercion of royal bureaucrats to acquire legal control of most of the land, now
worked by a subordinated class of wage workers. Whereas before status and power were defined
by the ability to access unpaid labor, they were now defined by ownership of haciendas worked
by poorly paid farm hands, while manual labor continued to be despised as the burden of the
lower classes. Although natives and mestizos desperate to escape exploitation began to drift to
the haciendas and towns, the land continued to be dominated by a privileged minority who lived
in the major urban centers; workers could barely command a decent wage or own much land
themselves. Most importantly, many Indians still had to provide labor for colonial elites and
Church institutions. The successive changes brought by the encomienda, the resguardo, and the
growing haciendas, only continued to “accelerate the natives´ social and racial disintegration”,
and the subordination of the countryside to the towns. 99

6. Legacies of Extraction and Inequality
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As we have seen, the conquest and consolidation of Spanish America unfolded through the
implementation of institutions that emphasized the privileged status of Spaniards, while placing
the native population in a position of institutional and socioeconomic inferiority. With ruthless
efficiency, the Spanish had adapted to the environment of the New World by taking advantage of
the specific pre-Columbian social hierarchies and institutions of sedentary and agriculturally
based populations that had focused for centuries on the collection of tribute through communal
labor. This explains why the Spaniards ruled such large populations with ease, while more
nomadic tribes were more difficult to conquer. 100 Most of these populations resided in the
lowland valleys. In 1570, Bogota was home to around 600 adult male Spaniards, supported by
around 40,000 male tribute payers, and Tunja had around 200 Spanish male settlers surrounded
by more than 50,000 male tribute payers; Velez, another important town 130 miles north of
Bogota, had about the same numbers as Tunja. 101 The Spaniards attempted to establish two
separate communities, a “Republica de Españoles” and a “Republica de Indios” through the
creation of encomiendas and resguardos. In the first century of colonial rule, this division
became fixed.
It is in this period too that urban settlements founded by conquistadors cemented their status
as the most important foci of power in the colonies. They were created solely as administrative
centers to control the native population. Only the necessity to communicate with other colonies
or with Europe forced the colonizers to create ports such as Cartagena and Santa Marta. Almost
no city in New Granada was founded with a commercial purpose. The Magdalena River was the
only passable route into the interior of the colony, but the only important settlements on the river
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were Honda (1539), which served as a way-station between Bogota and Cartagena (which was
worked by encomienda Indians), and Mompox (1539), which did have an active clay and
goldsmith industry, but which was too far from the main urban centers in the highlands to be of
major importance. 102 Towns were first and foremost centers of power, where peninsular and
creole elites lived, and from which mining and agriculture were directed.
The encomienda was for a time the only means to amass wealth. It also gave encomenderos
the ability to impose their will on other sectors of society. They invested in gold and emerald
mines, helped form cabildos and established the institutions that both governed the colony and
supported the clergy and bureaucrats that administered it. 103 Encomenderos controlled resource
allocation, the distribution of town lots and the assignment of Indians according to their and their
friends’ needs, funded new expeditions to further expand the empire, and supervised the priests
assigned to convert the local population. Political power was centered where Spaniards
established the most prominent encomiendas, that is, around Bogota and Tunja. 104 These became
the most important centers of colonial society in New Granada. In 1553, when the Pope made
Bogota a Metropolitan Bishopric through the influence of its encomenderos, 105 the city also
became the religious as well as political and economic capital of the country.
While the encomienda allowed encomenderos to become a privileged class, it also
subordinated the institutions of the hinterland to them, because the status and power of the
former depended on the exploitation of the latter. As previously mentioned, the power of the
encomenderos had only been defeated by the decline suffered by the natives as a result of
diseases and displacements, not by the attempts of the Crown to protect them, nor by any
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challenge from them to have a more elevated status. Yet once the encomienda started to decline,
and the number of free mestizos and other mixed-race groups increased, the evolution of a more
inclusive and egalitarian society was prevented by the creation of the resguardos. In order to
“protect” the Indians, they were placed in resguardos, Indian towns where Spaniards were
theoretically not allowed to live. 106 This reorganization gave religious authorities the ability to
engage with native communities more effectively, thus acculturating them more easily. At the
same time, the formation of resguardos freed up land previously occupied by inefficient and
abandoned encomiendas, opening the way for a new rural institution that benefited privileged
Spaniards, the hacienda.
The encomienda and resguardo institutions established a rigid hierarchy of privilege and
patronage –their most crucial elements- that determined the extent to which all sectors of
colonial society accessed wealth. During the first decades, as Spaniards began to settle areas
where “dense and docile populations (could) provide food and labor”, 107 encomenderos
solidified their political power by extending their patronage to every colonial institution and
economic activity. Thus, at the top of society were encomenderos, both big and small, 108 a
privileged class that did not work, but instead enjoyed the usufruct of the work of Indians. The
latter were at the bottom of society. They were expected to work and sustain the entire colonial
establishment. Their institutional status resembled that of children, incapable of making
independent decisions and dependent upon the patronage, direction and protection of their
masters. No one’s wealth came from the private ownership of land or individual
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entrepreneurship, which would have created a more balanced economy, and which might have
allowed different sectors to counterbalance the influence of the conquistador descended elite.
There could be no bourgeoisie in the Marxist sense, because no one owned the means of
production, which in this traditional society was land. All land remained entirely in the hands of
the Crown, (or more precisely, in the hands of Indians who were wards of the state. After the
creation or the resguardos, even this was no longer true.) Instead, wealth in New Granada was
accumulated by receiving labor, tribute, and tithes produced by the Indians. Even encomenderos
were (at least theoretically) vulnerable, since they could lose their rights to Indian labor at any
time. This would only change with the evolution of the hacienda.
Filling the gap between a small number of wealthy Spaniards and thousands of natives were
those Spaniards, caciques, and later mestizos who could not claim encomiendas. Forced to work
under an encomendero’s patronage, they formed part of his retinue, or worked as colonial
bureaucrats in his pay. 109 As for new settlers, or those hoping to strike out on their own, the
necessary incentives to become entrepreneurs were absent. Instead, they followed the model
established by their predecessors. They set out to find fresh Indian populations to exploit on new
encomiendas, or else find new gold mines and then petition the urban elites to provide them
Indians to work as mitayos. Either way, subordination to the authority of encomenderos and
complicity in their activities was necessary to survive in colonial society. 110 Unless a Spaniard
was able to establish himself as an endomendero (never an easy task), or be part of an
encomendero’s retinue, he ran the risk of being marginalized. As the encomienda spread
throughout New Granada, reinforcing its position as the dominant force in society, economic
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opportunities were both distinctly narrow and linked to those with access to Indians, while
economic exclusion and institutional marginalization became increasingly difficult to escape.
The later reorganization of the native population into resguardos and the subsequent
opening of land-owning opportunities simply continued older patterns of exploitation, although
different in form. Rather than moving to the countryside to work and manage their land, the new
landowning elite continued to live in cities as absent landlords. They had to, if they wanted to be
sure that colonial officials would continue to work for their interests. As a result, the old system
of subordination remained. The Crown continued to own the resguardos, so tribute and labor
obligations remained constant. Hacienda owners offered wages to free mestizos, mulattos and
Indians able to escape from resguardos, but in doing so, they established themselves as the new
“protectors and benefactors” of those who worked for them. The slow rise of the hacienda
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries thus continued to perpetuate the subordinate
status of the majority to the few.
There remained no practical equivalence between the institutions that governed cities
(Republica de Españoles), and those that governed the hinterland (Republica de Indios). The
institutions present in Bogota, Velez, Popayan, or Tunja functioned to protect the privileges of
Spaniards. Those in the countryside worked to reinforce a colonial hierarchy of privilege and
exploitation. The natives never contested the right of Spaniards to exact labor and tribute from
them, since this continued pre-Columbian practices. However, their complaints about the amount
of tribute rates and the hardships they suffered were rarely heard and amended. 111 A remarkably
pernicious pattern continued to develop: laws were enacted but were not enforced -unless they
favored the elites. In other words, “la ley se obedece pero no se cumple” – that is, the law is
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obeyed, but not complied with (It remains so in modern Columbia.) Whenever they could,
Spaniards pretended to obey the law, even claiming to be too powerless to be abusive, but in the
end did not comply. 112 When priests accused encomenderos of excessive exploitation the latter
replied with accusations of their own, but no institution served to contain the power of the elites,
or to protect the most vulnerable members of society. 113 The life of rural towns was thus
characterized by institutional coercion and social subordination. This prompted many Indians
and mestizos to resort to all kinds of trickery to evade persecution or oppression, or else to escape
to the relative anonymity of urban centers.

7. The Complexity of Socio-racial Categories and Status
One of the most important legacies of Spanish colonial rule in New Granada, which also
supported the subordination of the countryside to the political power of the towns, was the
complicated racial caste system structured around a concept of “Spanishness”. Spanish Catholics
had become obsessed with bloodlines long before their arrival in the Americas. Their original
religious antipathy to Muslims and Jews, combined with the fear of secret dissenters among them
after the formal expulsions of 1492, led to the association of religious belief with ancestry. This
was codified in the so-called limpieza de sangre, or purity of blood laws. In the days before any
understanding of genetics, religion was believed to be carried in the blood. Being truly Spanish
was dependent on whether one was a new (i.e. recently converted) or an old Christian -and
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“new” was now seen as problematical. 114 (The rules of admission to the later Jesuit order,
created by a Spaniard, would raise these concerns to a mania. No one with any Jewish ancestry
was allowed.) While religion was certainly important In Spanish America, the additional notion
of “Spanishness” in the New World resulted in all kinds of privileges or liabilities deriving from
ancestry. To be “Spanish” meant to be free of any tribute or labor obligations, while only
Spaniards could be a “vecino” (citizen) of any town (except of course Indian towns), be part of
its council, or hold office of any kind within the colonial administration or the Church. In
addition, only Spaniards could hold encomiendas, own urban property, or receive native tribute.
To be classified as “Indio”, on the other hand, meant one was part of a community that was
obliged to pay tribute, work the land, and remain barred from any kind of office except within an
Indian community. 115 To be Indian or to be Spanish was thus central to one’s status.
Despite all efforts to separate Indians and Spanish in order to preserve the purity of Spanish
blood, the legal walls between the different races proved quite permeable. This was true in both
urban and rural settings, and contributed to the slow ending of the system of encomienda and
resquardo-based serfdom. No longer bound to the land, many Indians and their mixed-race
offspring began to migrate to the largest cities. Many Indian women found work as domestic
servants there. Many other men and women supported themselves as casual laborers or
peddlers. 116 There were also a small number of African slaves bought by the richest Spaniards to
domestic servants. Others eventually became artisans, or even administrators.
In addition, there was a great deal of racial “confusion” in the countryside. Indians routinely
seeking to escape the rigid controls in their locality headed towards other resguardos to work as
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artisans, or officials. Many, having escaped from the control of their caciques, were able to selfidentify as mestizos, thus freeing themselves from paying tribute. 117 Resguardos and
encomiendas saw many such individuals enter their precincts in this way. Most difficult to
displace were those mestizos whose mothers already lived in the resguardos. In addition, despite
the efforts of the government to preserve the division between the Republica de Indios and the
Republica de Españoles, poor Spaniards, mestizos, and mulattos began to live amongst Indians in
greater numbers, taking the opportunity to gain control of Indian lands on encomiendas and near
resguardo towns. Native women continued to have children with these “new” settlers outside of
marriage, thereby increasing the number of rural inhabitants of mixed origins with remarkable
speed. It was in the midst of this racial mixing that colonial administrators struggled valiantly to
define what it meant to be Spanish, mestizo, mulatto, or Indian.
Racial divisiveness contributed to other kinds of social divisions as well. Spaniards did not
merely discriminate against everyone else. They also turned on each other. The original
conquistadors made a clear distinction between themselves and new arrivals. 118 During the late
colonial period an equally clear line was drawn between Iberian Spaniards and American born
creoles. Indians and those of Indian descent also learned how to turn against each other for
personal advantage. The pre-Colombian Indian nobility took advantage of their previous position
to negotiate a favorable status within the colonial hierarchy, while decades later the explosive
growth of mestizos allowed them to abuse Indians in encomiendas and resguardos. Their
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encroachment on Indian lands was one of the main causes of the decline of Indian communities
during the late colonial period. 119
At the same time, there were clear signs that racial categories were social constructs that
could be manipulated at will. Thus, the children of Indian nobility were frequently identified as
“mestizo” when it came to tribute obligations, demonstrating that race did not only define status,
but status could also determine “race.” 120 More tellingly, the sons of conquistadors born of
Indian women fought next to their fathers and were largely recognized as equals -even if
produced outside the bounds of Christian marriage. 121 In 1567 alone at least 13 mestizo men
travelled to Spain with their fathers to establish connections with their paternal families,
returning to New Granada some time before 1570. 122 It is evident that this first generation of
mestizos was able to assimilate into Spanish society, and was treated appropriately by their
conquistador fathers and peers.
This “privileged” mestizo status began to disappear after the first generation. The labor of
categorizing the population as Indio, mulatto, mestizo, or Spanish would later become an
important task during the visitas, (“visits”) of Crown officials in the colony throughout the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. (They would also become ever more imaginative in
inventing labels for people who continued through generations to have children with people
racially different from themselves.) Census officials visited every encomienda and resguardo
and interviewed every male and their families to determine tribute and labor obligations. By the

119

Ibid., p. 298
Joane Rappaport, “Letramiento y Mestizaje en el Nuevo Reino de Granada, Siglos XVI y XVII” (Literacy and
Mestizaje in the New Kingdom of New Granada, 16th and 17th Centuries). In Dialogo Andino (Online), No. 46,
(Universidad de Tarapaca, Arica, Chile, 2015): 14. Web.25 October, 2017; Victor M. Alvarez Morales, Mestizos y
Mestizajes en la Colonia (Mestizos and Mestizaje During the Colony). In Fronteras, No. 1, Volume 1 (Universidad
de Antioquia, Medellin, Colombia, 1997): 65-72.
121
Alvarez Morales, pp. 65-72. One of the most famous native women in Spanish American folklore is “Malinche”,
partner of Hernan Cortez during the conquest of the Aztec empire.
122
Ibid, p. 71.
120

51

seventeenth century, mestizos, although already numerous, were still legally forbidden to live in
Indian towns. But since many mestizos born in encomiendas and resguardos had close blood ties
with Indians, this was difficult to enforce. The visitas were designed to root out these individuals
deemed “disruptive” of Indian communities. The main reason of all this was of course to
maintain the profitability of the encomienda or resguardo.
The absurdity of the entire enterprise was highlighted by the whimsical way in which
individuals were sometimes characterized. There was one reported case of a self-identified
mulatto who had lived in a resguardo all his life, but whose children were categorized as Indians
simply for tribute purposes. There are other cases in which women who had been categorized as
“Indian” petitioned to be re-identified as mestizo because they had been vindictively categorized
as Indians. If successful, and some were, their children would not be subject to the tribute and
labor obligations of Indios. 123 It also seems clear that the closer a mixed-race child was to its
Spanish father, the closer he or she was to being categorized as “mestizo”, or, if fortunate
enough, as Spanish. But the closer the child was to its Indian, or even mestizo mother, the closer
he or she was to being branded as an “Indian”. 124 The presumed illegitimacy of mestizo children
certainly undermined their position, but it was still better than being burdened with all the
obligations of an indio. 125 It was these grotesque categorizations the defined the destiny of the
inhabitants of Spanish colonial society.
In cities categorizations tended to be broader since social relationships were more
complicated than in the resguardos and encomiendas. 126 For one thing, more people of mixed
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race were “born of legitimate marriages in which both parents were themselves in mixed
categories”. 127 Mulattos, the illegitimate children of Spanish men and domestic servants, were
most prevalent in those communities where slavery was critical, such as mining centers and the
Caribbean port of Cartagena, but they nonetheless had a presence in the central highlands of New
Granada as well. Urban centers also continuously received Indian, mestizo and mulatto migrants.
As mentioned above, many Indians lived in the main urban centers as domestic and servants,
while increasing numbers of mestizos and mulattos came in to fill intermediate artisanal roles
between the elites and the Indians. As Indians continued to decrease, the role of maids, street
peddlers, neighborhood store owners, and domestic servants also started to be filled by mestizos.
In general, while Indians, mestizos and mulattos were able to find more economic opportunities
in cities, as evidenced by the property mentioned in their wills 128, and were able to navigate the
social structure by escaping from the countryside, their choices were still determined by
socioeconomic conditions. While different in nature than in the hinterland, the institutional and
social marginalization of non-Spanish groups was clearly present in cities, giving origin to
concepts such as “gente decente” (decent people) for people of standing, and “plebe” and
“chusma” for the rest.
As Spanish elites continued to struggle to protect their position by insisting on racial
classifications, certain behaviors were assumed to be characteristic of each group. Indians were
at first considered to be docile and ripe for Christianization. One of the key assumptions in the
creation of the resguardos was that the negative forces agitating and disaffecting indigenous
people were coming from outside. Blacks, for example, were initially assumed to pose the
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biggest danger to Indian communities, due to their associations with alcohol and pagan customs.
The resguardo was supposed to keep the Indians docile, thus preserving them to continue
fulfilling their obligations. Yet, as the latter started to become unbearable, some either resisted or
simply escaped their communities. Spaniards then started to re-categorize them during the
seventeenth century as lazy, incorrigible, and incapable of civilization. By the eighteenth century
they were frankly regarded as stupid. 129 Throughout the colonial period, and well into the
Republican era, the status of “Indian” was informed by prejudices associated with their
socioeconomic condition and their relationship to the elites.
Similarly, the mestizo population started to be regarded in strongly negative ways. Given
that sexual relations between Spanish men and women of other groups almost never took place
within marriage, the connotation of illegitimacy was very closely linked to the meaning of
“mestizo”. 130 They were also considered troublemakers, and most of the prohibitions against
groups living among Indians were targeted at them. 131 (It must be admitted that they did not help
themselves by their abusive treatment of Indians in resguardos, encomiendas, and even in urban
centers, since their status gave them institutional superiority over natives.) These problems only
became more pressing as their numbers continued to grow. Ironically, them being the group most
closely “related” to the Spanish, made it more necessary in the opinion of the elites to strengthen
(at least juridically) the distinctions between them and Europeans. Being mostly illegitimate
children, they could by law not be part of a Spaniard´s family, nor could they inherit any
property from their father. They were thus forced to seek generous patrons, develop artisanal
skills, or try to acquire land from encomiendas and resguardos (ultimately unsuccessfully, as
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explained above). As was common in Europe, Spaniards drew clear lines between their
legitimate and their “natural” children. That most of the latter came from relationships with
Indians, slaves, and later women of mixed race only made that distinction more obvious in the
New World than in the Old.
A famous case in colonial New Granada dealing with ethnic identity and status pointedly
reveals how racial categorization helped cement elite privilege. This concerns Don Diego de
Torres, the product of a union between a Spanish conquistador and the sister of an Indian
cacique. 132 Diego had lost a legal battle in the late sixteenth century for a cacique position in an
encomienda near Bogota against his half-brother, Pedro de Torres, the legitimate son of their
father and a Spanish woman. Despite being born outside of marriage, Diego had been recognized
by his father, was educated by Spanish friars, and lived among the Spanish elite in Tunja and
Bogota. He even had the resources to travel to Madrid, where he married a Spanish woman.
Diego had been able to find allies and favorable testimonies from some Crown officials in New
Granada because he had opposed some of the abuses of encomenderos. While never denying his
mestizo origin, he claimed that his Spanishness would allow him to keep other mestizos, who he
characterized as dangerous and vicious, away from the encomienda. He implied in this way that
his Spanishness redeemed his Indian blood. However, even though Diego was considered
Spanish enough by his allies, he lost the fight, and the encomienda position was assigned to
agents of encomenderos allied with his half-brother. The colonial courts had decided in favor of
Pedro de Torres because he had argued that Diego´s condition as a mestizo was in fact a threat to
the social hierarchy dominated by Spaniards. Implicit in Pedro´s argument was a fear that an
illegitimate and literate mestizo such as Don Diego Torres could, with institutional
132
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empowerment, pit other mestizos against the colonial elite and dangerously disrupt the entire
social balance. 133
The case reveals not only the importance that the European elite placed on racial
classification, but also, remarkably, the juridical artificiality of such distinctions. Racial
categories were in fact so fluid at times that the identification of a specific group in one locality
might not apply in others. Likewise, socioracial status might be adjusted depending on individual
perceptions and legal vagaries -two litigants could define racial identity from two opposing
perspectives. The assignation of individuals to a particular category largely depended on how
those of higher status were affected. 134 A person could be Spanish, mestizo, or even Indian -even
if they truly weren’t. Because of all of this, maintaining a rigid social hierarchy based on race
turned into an institutional nightmare. But while Spanishness and “mestizaje” was an ambiguous
and institutionally ambivalent situation for everyone who wasn’t Spanish, it is undeniable that
socio-racial constructions attributed negative attributes to non-Spanish groups. These prejudices
were translated most powerfully into marginalization and institutional vulnerability, and later
into the outright racial discrimination that became increasingly evident throughout the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries.

8. Life under the Republic
The fundamental problems of colonial Latin American society did not end with the creation
of independent republics in the early nineteenth century. Colombia might have gained
independence from Spain in 1819 after Simon Bolivar´s decisive victory at the Battle of Boyaca
on August 7th, but the new republic continued to be plagued by severe socioeconomic
133

These dangers were corroborated by testimonies from other encomenderos, bishops, and other colonial elites.
Nowadays, Colombian society in general still retains many aspects of these colonial attitudes. Recognizing their
origin is an important first step in addressing socioeconomic based inequalities.
134

56

inequalities and institutional weakness. Consequently, it has repeatedly fallen into disorder, the
result of numerous, disastrous civil wars, especially during the nineteenth century. Even today,
the supposedly democratic institutions that govern the nation have largely failed the vast
majority of the population, due to rampant corruption and the selfishness of the elites. This is due
almost entirely to the country’s colonial legacy.
The hacienda owners had supplanted encomenderos in the course of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, but this had done little to change the fundamental dynamics of the society.
The royal road to power and wealth in New Granada continued to be the ability of the elites to
sway governmental institutions to work for their own narrow interests. By the end of the colonial
period, the vast majority of the population had been subordinated to the patronage of powerful
urban elites with enormous landholdings in the countryside. Urban centers under the Republic
continued to be the foci of political power. Most of the former audiencia and gobierno capitals
had simply become the provincial capitals of the new nation. Their status remained intact thanks
to the elites who continued to live there. This creole elite had been the main organizers of the
struggle for independence, and as a result, the republic largely belonged to them. Once
victorious, they had been able to shape the institutional structure of the new nation. While most
of the Colombian “Founding Fathers” were either trained as lawyers or military men very
comfortable with Enlightenment rhetoric, the actual source of their wealth and status came
almost exclusively from traditional, inherited family holdings (a condition not dissimilar to that
of many of the founders of the North American republic. 135) Their heads might have been full of
notions of republican virtue, but their feet of clay remained the legacy of brutal colonial
exploitation that had left them at the top of society.
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They were equally unable to escape the quarrels that had characterized Colombian elites
through the colonial period. Retaining access to political power was essential for individuals in
this group, since it was the only way to ensure economic success. This resulted in constant bitter
factional disputes. When Bogota was chosen as the national capital, thanks to the political
acumen of its residents, elites in the provinces were determined to resist control coming from the
center. This resulted in a division between Centralists and Federalists. It later evolved into
conflicts between so-called Conservatives and Liberals. Emboldened by the isolation of their
landholdings, Colombia´s difficult topography, and the support of the hundreds of laboring
families subordinated to their patronage, provincial elites repeatedly rebelled against the central
government. After the death of Simon Bolivar in 1830 and the dissolution of the Gran Colombia
(of Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela), civil wars erupted in 1839-41, 1851, 1854, 1860-62,
1876-77, 1884-85, 1895, and 1899-1902. This does not take into account frequent secessionist
threats from Panama —a separation that was made successful in 1903 because of United States
support. During the Federalist period (1863-1886), there were dozens of conflicts between
regional elites, who without major interference from the central government felt free to increase
their power at the expense of their neighbors with the use of their own provincial armies. These
struggles for power and wealth, although disguised by rhetorical devices, were essentially a
mirror image of the conflicts between conquistadors, encomenderos and royal agents during the
colonial period. The tide of victories thus swung endlessly back and forth between Liberals and
Conservatives in battles that were largely devoid of any real ideological content. Yet every
success on one side only added to the bitterness of the other, resulting in new rebellions as soon
as the winning party showed signs of weakness.
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Colombia therefore never suffered from typical urban versus rural, or industrial versus
agrarian conflict, since the elite factions did not differ much in terms of their economic holdings
or social policies. If there was any difference between them during the nineteenth century, it was
between the Federalist (Liberal) and Centralist (Conservative) position about the role of the
Church in education and politics. This was supported by the Conservatives and resisted by the
Liberals.
Above all of this there was the office of the president. That was the greatest prize for which
both factions longed. Thanks to the influence of Bolivar, who saw the need for a strong central
executive power to govern the weak countries he had liberated, it had become the most
prestigious and powerful position in Colombia, almost akin to that of a monarch. 136 In a country
where hacienda owners pursued their own partisan provincial interests, the president, being the
single most important source of patronage, was almost uniquely able to create and command a
national network of parasitic but loyal subordinates. The term cacique thus took on a new
meaning. In colonial times, this had been an Indian who was able to mediate between the
Spanish and the indigenous population. It now came to signify a partisan regional agent. Every
Colombian president maintained a network of caciques in all the towns, which in turn distributed
important offices and public money, thereby maintaining the local supremacy of his own
party. 137 The opposition (whatever that was at the moment) maintained its own network. In this
way, the nation alternated between Centralist and Federalist governments, and later between
Conservative and Liberal regimes. These changes were always preceded by civil wars. There
was never any sense of a national community that might work honestly for peaceful, democratic
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transitions of power. Most people never identified with anything beyond their own patron’s
interests, and the hope that his victory might bring them some small benefits. Whatever the
precipitating reason for the conflict, every struggle was ultimately about who was going to have
control of the national patronage network that could provide even greater power and wealth.
The Colombian elites had no ability to compromise, because unlike North American
politics, there was nothing to compromise about. There were hardly any ideological differences,
except about religion, and politics operated in the realm of absolutes. One side had national
power, and hence access to enormous wealth, or it did not (it is instructive to note that when
United States politics reached a similar impasse in 1860, the result was most murderous war in
the Western world in the entire nineteenth century.) The fragmented nature of the country’s
political life, combined with its rugged geography, the absence of efficient institutions outside
the main urban centers, and the lack of creative economic entrepreneurship, all contributed to a
profound national disunity that has kept the country in a constant state of institutional and
socioeconomic underdevelopment.
When the Federalists gained power in the 1860s, they rebuilt the country’s institutions in
order to strengthen their position by making their supporters rich. Among the first things they did
was expropriate the lands of the Church, then the country’s largest landowner, and also an ally of
their Conservative opponents. 138 Only partially compensated, Church lands and buildings in the
various provinces were sold to those who were supposed to be the highest bidders. In an almost
exact repetition of the acquisition of resguardo and encomienda lands by the hacienda elite, only
major city-dwelling landowners friendly with the government were able to gain control of most
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of it. 139 Thus, governance in rural areas under supposedly Liberal anti-clericals continued the
patterns of the colonial era. Elite rhetoric might change over the centuries, but their actual
practice remained constant. As for the countryside, regional authority was supposed to emanate
from the provincial capitals. In fact, these towns only served as headquarters for agents of the
central government sent to rule the hinterland.
Then, in 1884 another civil war broke out between the factions, resulting in a Conservatives
victory. This was followed by a new 1886 Constitution which further centralized power in
Bogota, eliminated federalism, and restored the position of the Church as an important political
as well as social institution. A Concordat then followed, giving the Church control of the
country’s education system (and in effect making it an important part of the Conservative
patronage network). 140
The collusion of wealthy city dwellers with the government might appear to be some variety
of the much-maligned modern-day crony capitalism. That would be profoundly wrong. Crony
capitalism can be the use that innovative entrepreneurs make of government connections to
advance their businesses. This was not true in Colombia because for a very long time there were
no creative capitalist elites. Colonial wealth had originally been largely derived from mining
(and mine labor) given to conquistadors as rewards for military prowess. This was loot, and had
nothing to do with genuine entrepreneurship. The distribution of farmland (which was worked in
very traditional ways) was similarly the result of grants acquired through bureaucratic favoritism.
Haciendas were won through connivance, and not earned in any real economic sense.
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Guillen Martinez, pp. 388-392
For an overview of the Concordat, see Fernan E. Gonzalez Gonzalez, “El Concordato de 1887: Los
Antecedentes, las Negociaciones, y el Contenido del Tratado con la Santa Sede” (The Concordat of 1887:
Background, Negotiations, and Content of the Treaty with the Holy See). In Credencial de Historia No. 41 (Banco
de la Republica, Bogota, Colombia, 1993). Web. December 5th, 2017
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The difference between this and genuine entrepreneurship free of corrupt government ties is
highlighted by the remarkable development of the so-called Colonizacion Antioqueña
(Antioquian Colonization), which began in the late eighteenth century and extended well into the
twentieth. Here is one area where the local economy successfully escaped the dead weight of
political cronyism, and the detrimental legacy of exploitation and inequality that Spanish
colonial rule left in Colombia. It is here that small landowners coming from the central and
western highlands created hundreds of towns in the region that today comprises Colombia´s
“coffee belt”. 141 Their achievement turned out to be one of the most influential cultural, social,
and economic events in the nation’s history. This is because the development of the coffee
industry, indispensable to the nation throughout the twentieth century, also nurtured
entrepreneurs who helped the country´s industrial development. Key to all this was the region’s
almost complete absence of colonial institutions and geographic isolation, which left it free from
the upheavals of the late colonial and republican decades, as well as the exploitation of the
encomienda and resguardos.
The region of colonial Antioquia had been largely emptied of its native inhabitants soon
after the arrival of the Spanish because of disease, displacement and war. The encomiendas given
to Spaniards there therefore rapidly disappeared, and the surviving remnant of the indigenous
population was quickly absorbed as mitayo labor. Without a local native population to exploit,
the regional towns focused on limited mining operations. By the eighteenth century, Antioquia
had become one of the poorest regions in New Granada, as well as one of the biggest importers
of African slaves. While the elites of Bogota, Tunja, and Popayan used the political machinery to
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The colonizacion Antioqueña by settlers unconnected from the landowning political elites operating through their
own individual initiative is unique in post-independence Spanish America. It strongly resembles the colonization of
the western United States during the nineteenth century.
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become the legal owners of large haciendas elsewhere, the focus in Antioquia was on its mines.
Without an Indian population, the countryside was largely unworked. Because the elites of
Antioquia did not possess the same resources to acquire status, political power, and wealth as
their counterparts in other parts of New Granada, they were also unable to prevent the entry
through the late eighteenth century of many outsiders - “wildcat” independent miners of different
racial origins who poured into the region. This created a society of self-employed minerprospectors who could focus on “attending to his and his family’s needs, (while) receiving a
higher income than elite mine owners could have offered.” 142
This group of adventurers was soon joined by large numbers of others who came to the
region following the example of the miners, but who now focused on acquiring land and working
it themselves. This was possible because centuries of isolation and desolation had prevented the
formation of a parasitical elite, so common elsewhere, which could have prevented the
development of independent small-scale landowning. Even parish priests, who in the areas
around Bogota and Tunja served as the agents of hacienda owners, turned into community
leaders who helped protect the rights of their parishioners. 143
The first settlements were founded by settlers devoted to the raising of their families, and
who actively participated in the functioning of local institutions. More importantly, this grass
roots commitment to community was indispensable in defending their rights from the few
traditional landowners in the region. “These immigrant families, committed to reap the rewards
of their own work, had a great sense of egalitarianism, cooperation, and communal participation,
which prevented the formation of large latifundial holdings (which would have been worthless
without tributary labor to work it), creating the possibility of the emergence of a rural middle
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Guillen Martinez, p. 147. Spanish whites, mestizos, and even mulattos formed part of this group.
Ibid, p. 379.
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class already evident by 1800”. 144 Since family landholdings were insufficient to provide for all
the children, thousands were forced to leave their places of origin to search for land of their own,
thereby facilitating the creation of new towns similar to those that their fathers had created, all
characterized by closely-knit communities in good rapport with their parish priests, and pooling
labor resources to acquire and clear the land cooperatively. Settlers travelled south and west of
Medellin to found hundreds of small towns between the upper Magdalena and Cauca river
valleys. The modern provinces of Caldas, Quindio, Risaralda, northern Tolima, and northern
Valle del Cauca were all populated by this Colonizacion Antioqueña.
Still, this was hardly an egalitarian utopia. The socio-racial stigmas prevalent in New
Granada were still present in the new communities. There were large numbers of mestizos and
mulattos among the immigrants. While many were able to get some land, the majority of
landowners were white. Despite the necessity of maintaining strong communities, social
distinctions remained important, and the non-white population was unable to escape negative
stereotypes that existed everywhere in New Granada. Yet, rather than forming a subordinated
laboring class, most non-whites formed their own groups of miners and traders. More
importantly they eventually developed a quasi-monopoly in the transport of goods using pack
animals, 145 a service that was indispensable in connecting and supplying burgeoning new
communities.
Despite all its flaws, the pattern of settlement during the Colonizacion Antioqueña stands in
marked contrast with that of colonial rule elsewhere in New Granada. Settlers had founded
hundreds of new towns populated not by parasitical elites looking to control unfree labor, but by
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Ibid, p. 150.
This is the origin of the “arriero”, muleteer, famous in Colombia for transporting agricultural products as they
made their way through the treacherous regional topography. The fictional character Juan Valdez, created in 1958, is
the symbol of the archetypal coffee muleteer.
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small landowners who worked their own land. In the absence of a hacienda elite, the
communities of the Colonizacion Antioqueña were able to maintain institutional autonomy away
from the main urban centers, and to build a kind of participatory democracy that allocated land
and enforced the law with a degree of inclusiveness not seen anywhere else in Colombia. The
effects of all this were remarkable. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the Antioqueños had
developed such an entrenched culture of landowning independence, hard work, and
entrepreneurship, that even most of the financiers in Bogota were from Antioquia. 146
The most remarkable development in all was the emergence of Medellin, which became rich
enough to lead the transition to a more industrial economy. Medellin was founded in 1616, but
without major encomiendas or resguardos, it never housed important elites. 147 Energized
throughout the nineteenth century by the abundance of small landowners and the rising middle
class, it had created sufficient synergy to attract ambitious entrepreneurs from outside the
country, making it the most cosmopolitan as well as economically exciting city in the country. Its
future seemed so bright that some optimists among its elite even inspired them in the early
decades of the twentieth century to attempt to broker a reconciliation between Liberals and
Conservatives, while using access to key public offices to encourage elites elsewhere to invest in
local industrial projects and the coffee boom.
Unfortunately, this marked the beginning of the end. Despite the early success of the
Colonizacion Antioqueña, its entrepreneurial class was eventually absorbed into the corrosive
Colombian power politics. Still, the business legacy created by Antioqueños did spread to other
parts of the country, encouraging industrialization and an improvement in communications, and
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allowing some towns to develop a more commercial identity. 148 It certainly encouraged
individuals outside of the elites to participate in business. Nationally, the ultimate result of all
this was a curious (and bewildering) amalgam of old traditions and new economic and social
impulses, as the old legacy of colonial exploitation and isolation continued to exist uneasily in a
nation characterized by a growing political consciousness of a rising urban working class (as
indicated by the emergence of syndicalism), the coffee bonanza, the nascent industrialization in
the cities, and increased foreign investment (especially in mining), all under the dubious aegis of
the central government, with its factional politics and regional caciques. 149 The civil strife that
erupted in the second half of the twentieth century was largely due to this mixture of discordant
elements. But it was especially the result of older entrenched elites attempting to use the
institutional machinery of government to coerce the newer economic and social groups into
submission.
One of the most striking aspects of current Colombian political life has been the decline of
elite control of the peasantry. This had long been managed through traditional patronage
relationships. Taking the rural population for granted, the elites had neglected the countryside
institutionally and economically for centuries. Part of this change is due to massive peasant
migration. The provincial capitals continue receive large numbers of rural migrants escaping a
perpetual absence of economic opportunities. This has resulted not only in increased urban
poverty, but also the emergence of ever more strident voices denouncing social injustice and
historic privileges
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Cali, near the Pacific coast, and Barranquilla, at the mouth of the Magdalena River, owe much of their economic
growth to this period.
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Even Colombian syndicalism, however, did not entirely develop along the lines of class struggle, but, as had
happened in the country many times before, became an added element in the fight between rival patronage groups
within the Liberal elite. See Guillen Martinez, pp. 438-445, Safford and Palacios, pp. 292-296. The Conservative
response to this new partisan tool was the creation of the ANDI (National Industrialists Association) and the
National Coffee Federation, as well as Conservative workers´ associations.
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Even more menacingly, the armed bands that had previously fought on behalf of rival
patrons have now given way to left-wing agrarian communist guerrilla movements. Traditional
partisan loyalties had already been completely transformed during the violent decades between
1950 and 1970. This in turn prompted long warring elites to join forces to combat the newest
menace to their authority and power: the leftwing guerrillas, right-wing paramilitary forces, and
drug mafias (frequently hardly distinguishable one from the other), that continue to terrorize
areas of the Colombian countryside to the present day.
Even when people outside the elite have been able to take control of local political
institutions through elections, conditions have not improved. Repeating what caciques, poor
Spaniards and mestizos did in encomiendas and resguardos centuries earlier, these emergent
political leaders have used the newly captured machinery of government to increase their status
and personal wealth, while excluding those outside their own charmed circle. 150 Some things in
Colombia never change, and the old colonial lessons of how to exploit a subordinated population
have endured. Consequently, the nation´s rural areas have not witnessed investments in
education, transportation, or public works, while the rural population, mostly subsistence farmers
or small-scale traders, have continued to face institutional obstacles that discourage
entrepreneurship that does not directly benefit the politically powerful. Therefore, investments in
infrastructure are almost exclusively focused on connecting the main urban centers with ports,
leaving most of the hinterland underdeveloped and preventing the growth of an integrated
national market. With the modernization of the country, the gap between the elites and the poor,
and the indifference of the state in creating stability in rural areas, have become more evident
than ever before. As a result, the danger of new political upheaval is ever present.
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Even the FARC and ELN guerrillas, as well as the Medellin and Cali drug cartels have made use of traditional
forms of patronage to expand their influence throughout the country and protect their positions. The cartels have
also ironically become important vehicles for social mobility.
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Today, amidst unequal and localized socioeconomic progress, which has unfolded in spite of
the nation’s parasitical elites, the legacies of the colonial era continue to haunt Colombia. In the
midst of all of this turmoil, the country continues its slow and uneven process of modernization,
economic expansion, social mobility, and national integration. Meanwhile, the political
institutions of the country continue to operate in the same ways for which they were originally
intended when the Spanish first created their exploitative, hierarchical imperium.

9. Conclusion
From the time Cortes and his conquistadors landed in 1519 at Veracruz, through the
conquest of the Inca Empire and well beyond, the Spanish had one simple aim – to acquire as
much gold, silver and other treasure as they could. They were overwhelmingly successful. Once
firmly established in the Americas, their chief preoccupation was the mining of additional metal.
This was extracted with the use of Indian labor, and exported to Spain.
Aside from the important crop and animal exchange between the Old World and the New,
Spain’s two chief exports to the Americas were Roman Catholicism and Old World diseases.
The first was intentional, the other not. Whatever the motivation of the missionaries, the hoped
for effect of the first was the acceptance by the indigenous population of a colonial hierarchy that
obliged them to work for their Spanish masters. The unintended effect of the second was the
extinction of much of the native population. This initially reduced their numbers to a manageable
size, but eventually threatened to reduce the work force disastrously.
As in all economies based on extractive industry, there was little inventive entrepreneurship.
But then, none was required. Nor would the new colonial rulers have held it in anything but
disdain. Castilians had come to the New World believing in the importance of war and military
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glory. Their job was to fight, and conquer. In this they had succeeded beyond their wildest
dreams. Having done their work, they expected to spend the rest of their lives living off the fruits
of victory – that is, off the work of unpaid Indian labor. They did not see the need to make any
other contributions, and the cities they created were purely political centers intended not for
commerce or manufacture, but for the administration and control of indigenous people.
There were other reasons for this striking lack of manufacturing and entrepreneurship. The
first was the absence of what Karl Marx would have called a bourgeoisie, the group he defined as
the owners of the means of production. In a traditional society, that meant land. But what was
most remarkable about the Spanish empire was that for a long time no European owned any of it.
By royal decree the soil continued to belong to the Native American population. Christian
conversion had protected them at least to this extent. Encomenderos only had claim to Indian
labor, and this only by grace of the Crown. Even that privilege could not be inherited beyond the
second generation. It could also be taken way at any time by royal command. As mighty as the
great Spanish colonial lords might have appeared, their whole economic existence was both
fragile and temporary. (The centuries-long struggle they waged with royal peninsular born
officials to make their position both robust and permanent was the source of one of the great
political and legal dramas of the Hispanic New World.)
The second reason was a notably small European population. That was because only
Catholics were allowed to emigrate to the Spanish colonial empires. The Church feared that the
presence of heretics would confuse indigenous peoples. The actual result was that very few
Spaniards felt any need to resettle across the Atlantic. (Religious minorities anxious to leave
Spain therefore had to find refuge elsewhere. Among them were Castilian Jews who eventually
settled in Ottoman ruled Salonika.) This is in striking contrast to English policy, which used the
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colonies as dumping grounds for unwanted religious minorities (which is how the North
American colonies from Massachusetts to Maryland were populated) or for criminals (as in the
case of Georgia, and later Australia).
The English, whether consciously or not, had followed the ancient Greek and Roman
practice of setting their own people in new places. (The original Latin term “colonia” means a
farm, or settled land.) Earlier inhabitants were regarded as impediments to be swept aside.
Massachusetts Puritans had been inspired by the Biblical story of the Children of Israel entering
the land of Canaan. While certainly exaggerated, this attitude was not untypical. (The British
would first face the challenge of dealing with a large indigenous population only in the
eighteenth century, when the East India Company began full-fledged rule in parts of India.)
The Spanish Catholic Church had a different vision. Indigenous peoples were to be both
“saved”, and embraced spiritually (and, despite its best efforts, carnally). It is one of the great
ironies of history that this decision proved almost as much a disaster as more ruthless English
policies. Diseases such as smallpox and measles spread with remarkable velocity. It also
eventually produced a very large mixed-race population that Spanish officials had great difficulty
in controlling, or even categorizing. The panic this diversity produced in official circles is
demonstrated in the increasingly elaborate and recondite racial charts that became a common
place throughout the empire. 151
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According to official classifications, children of Spanish and Indian parents were mestizos. The child
of a Spaniard and a mestizo was a castizo. The child of a Spaniard and an African (classified as Negro)
was a mulato. The offspring of a Spaniard and a mulato was a morisco. The child of an African and an
Indian was a zambo. Other more complicated racial mixtures resulted in abusive terms such as lobo
(wolf) and chino (from cochino – pig), or others as fanciful as turna atras (turns back) and tente en el aire
(hold yourself in mid-air). The entire system was as cruel as it was absurd. Magali Carrera, Imagining
Identity in New Spain: Race, Lineage, and the Colonial Body in Portraiture and Casta Paintings (Joe R. and Teresa
Lozano Long Series in Latin American and Latino Art and Culture) (University of Texas Press, Austin, 2003), p. 12
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The original simple colonial division of a Republica de Españoles and a Republica de Indios
that insured a docile labor supply for the mines began to be threatened by a growing number of
people whose partial European origin exempted them from much of the tributary labor demanded
of Indians. The original bureaucratic response was to create the resguardos, places where these
might remain untouched by promiscuous Spaniards, as well as the subversive influence of
blacks, mestizos, and mulattos. However, this eventually led to a fundamental disruption of
property relationships, as the creation of Indian reservations emptied land that for the first time
came to be owned outright by Spanish elites.
The evolution of the encomienda with its quasi-serf labor to the freehold hacienda worked
by paid farm hands was remarkable. The way in which the Spanish compensated themselves for
the loss of servile labor with the ownership of land was a great political achievement. But more
remarkable than any of this was the unchanging nature, through it all, of Colombian towns, and
of the way in which institutions have been coerced to serve a privileged minority. 152 Throughout
the colonial period, and during the republic up to today, the major towns have remained centers
of political and economic exclusiveness. Their narrow and self-serving elites continue to enrich
themselves by ensuring access to the institutional machinery, while the great majority of the
population, whether urban or rural, remain largely without opportunity or hope. Institutions
continue to follow a dichotomy of efficiency through deceit for political elites, and of
subordination and inefficiency for the rest, reinforcing the colonial pattern in which institutions
only work if one has the ability to influence them through trickery. Even the so-called
Colonizacion Antioqueña, with its self-sufficient farmers, non-parasitic town populations,
foreign entrepreneurs, and inclusive social relations could not change the nation’s old colonial
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Government contracting, concessions, provincial revenues, and multinational royalties, for example, are almost
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the most part only beneficiaries. Thus, modern Colombian institutions continue to be extractive in nature.
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pattern of exploitative urban domination and rural subservience. 153 The city and the countryside
continue to live in two separate worlds. 154 This unresponsiveness of the former to the latter
remains one of Colombia’s greatest problem today.
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The great irony is that the success of the Colonizacion Antioqueña was predicated on the absence of an Indian
population to exploit.
154
This same severe urban rural division was a commonplace in Central and Eastern Europe right until the end of
the Second World War. Travelers in Hungary were especially struck by the contrast between modern conditions and
attitudes in Budapest and a countryside still living as it had in the eighteenth century.
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